The Unilateralist Temptation: Germany’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War ANNE-MARIE LE GLOANNEC I n the twelve years that elapsed between the fall of the Wall and the fall of the Twin Towers, analysts and commentators, politicians and public opinion in Germany and abroad speculated on whether a reunited Ger­many would pursue the same foreign policy as before. Most thought that the new Germany would be somewhat different from the old Federal Re­public, more powerful, more central than West Germany; hence they ex­pected that it would defend its interests from a stronger position. Some analysts and commentators even called for a radical change and for a pow­erful role in Europe and in the world. However, it was generally assumed that the foreign policy of the new Germany would not dramatically differ from the old one: certainly Germany would be more powerful and asser­tive, certainly change and continuity would go hand in hand, yet on the whole the latter would prevail. After all, unification had taken place under Western auspices. German institutions had not changed, neither had its commitments. It remained embedded in the Western community of states and its multilateral, intergovernmental and supranational institu­tions. Indeed, for some time Germany’s foreign policy did appear to follow its previous path. Thanks to Chancellor Kohl, Germany’s unification was paralleled by its further integration in an ever closer Europe as the Ger­man government agreed to give up the dm and its monetary sovereignty against a majority of public opinion. Certainly, the Kohl government had some fits of unilateralism, pressing for instance for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in the winter of 1991–92 without having weighed the dramatic consequences of supporting the independence of new coun­tries while not being able to defend them. It also called for the defence of narrow interests as opposed to broader, European interests and in 1997, at the Intergovernmental Conference in Amsterdam, it proposed a veto on the use of qualified majority voting on immigration issues which were to become Community matters, whereas it had formerly pleaded for an increased transfer of sovereignty to Brussels. ipg 1/2004 Le Gloannec, Germany’s Foreign Policy 27