Germany and the USA in the»War against Terror«: Is Extraordinary Rendition Putting Transatlantic Cooperation under Strain? SIMON KOSCHUT W hen President George W. Bush announced the»war against terror« on September 20, 2001 he made clear that, besides the warning to hostile regimes, this would have definite consequences for the usa ’s clos­est allies, both old and new. In this way the American president presented the world with a choice:»Every nation, in every region, now has a deci­sion to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists« (Bush 2001). In this way President Bush emphasized that the fight against international terrorism threatened all pluralistic and free nations. Along­side military action in the course of Operation Enduring Freedom police and secret service cooperation between the usa and members of the anti­terror alliance should also prevent international terrorism from acquiring territory and financial resources. Germany was an early participant in common measures in the anti­terror fight and expressed its solidarity with the usa on September 12, 2001 with its agreement to nato ’s casus foederis. Since then Germany has been an ally of the usa in its global»war against terror.« However, it is clear from the Iraq war that Washington and Berlin can act not only side by side, but also, increasingly, against one another. Accusations of alleged cia secret prisons and prisoner transports in Europe are putting transatlantic cooperation to a severe test. The mutual accusations arising from this on the nonmilitary level threaten the transatlantic value system and consequently can hinder transatlantic cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The central question, therefore, is: to what extent has transat­lantic cooperation in the»war against terror« been changed by the public debate on the usa ’s rendition program and what consequences does this have for German–American relations? In what follows we shall first explain the so-called rendition program in more detail, in order to explain the accusations of possible German participation in this controversial practice. Finally, against the back­ground of this question, we have to demonstrate the consequences of these accusations for transatlantic relations. 36 Koschut, Extraordinary Rendition Program ipg 3/2007