IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VENICE COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS OF LAW 26/2022 ON PRE-VETTING judgment, universally binding in its application, given by their predecessors, a judgment which had been in force for the pre­vious ten years(see also Article 190 of the Polish Constitution cited in paragraph 59 above). 239. The purported aim to be achieved by means of the new inter­pretation of the Constitution, radically changing the existing election model, was to ensure that all the judges would have equal opportunities to stand for election to the NCJ. However, the Court has been unable to detect any attempt on the part of the CC to explain in its judgment why and how the new election model would better serve the interests of the judiciary and equal opportunities or whether, and if so how, it would impact upon the NCJ’s primary constitutional obliga­tion of safeguarding the independence of courts and judges, as laid down in Article 186(1) of the Constitution. Likewise, in the CC’s assessment, no consideration appears to have been given to the Convention case law or the fundamental Convention principles of the rule of law, separation of powers, and inde­pendence of the judiciary, principles which are also enshrined in the Polish Constitution and were obviously relevant in the context of the new interpretation. Furthermore, as demonstrated by subsequent developments, both at domestic and international level, the CC appears to be isolated in its perception and assessment of the necessity and legitimacy of the change in the procedure for election of the judicial members of the NCJ.” From this perspective, the Venice Commission’s recommenda­tion to verify the existence of a“sufficient basis” for pre-vetting indicates that the authorities must have valid and well-founded reasons to initiate such an assessment. Any change to the way in which the SCM is constituted must not detract from the independence of this public authority of constitutional rank and must not place it under political influence or control. As a consequence, any legislative intervention in its composition must be justified and thoroughly reasoned. In other words, this requirement aims to avoid possible political manipulation or outside influence on the judiciary depending on the results of parliamentary elections. 11.5 Does the creation of a Commission outside the judiciary respect the constitutional principles of separation of powers and mutual control? According to Opinion No. 1069/2021, the Venice Commission noted that: “16. Furthermore, the fact that the integrity checks will be car­ried out not by the self-governing bodies of the judiciary and procuracy themselves, but rather by an external body(...), requires that the utmost consideration be given to respect­ing the constitutional principles of separation of powers and checks and balances.” From this perspective, the CC of the Republic of Moldova was to provide a clear answer to the objections related to the ex­istence of a sufficient basis for subjecting the members of the SCM to an extraordinary assessment in relation to the reason­ing of its previous Decision No. 3 of February 2012. Such a procedure is not at all alien to the case law of the CC. For example, − according to paragraph 23 of Decision No. 13 of 14 May 2018, the Court has indicated that it may subsequently decide that the interpretation it made in previous cases can be developed or that there are other compelling reasons to change its interpretation, including to ensure that the way it interprets the Constitution reflects social changes and coincides with the conditions of life today.[...] The rea­soning present in these cases are compelling reasons for the Court to develop its own case law on the basis of the authority of the European Court’s judgments as a matter of case law; and − according to paragraph 38 of Decision No. 38 of 6 August 2020,[...] in the light of the reasoning set out above, the Court deems it necessary to re-evaluate its reasonings and the solution established by Decision No. 28 of 17 October 2017. The lack of a clear position from the CC may create a danger for the principle of independence of the judiciary, which will have more of an illusory and theoretical character. Through the CC notification of 22 March 2022, Vasile Bolea, then deputy in the parliamentary faction of the Bloc of Communists and Socialists, raised this issue before the Court. However, in its Decision No. 9 of 7 April 2022, the CC dismissed this claim as inadmissible. In this respect, the CC held that: “20. With regard to the incidence of Articles 6 and 116, the author of the complaint noted that the establishment of the magistrates’ Evaluation Commission, whose members are appointed by the Parliament, would violate the principle of separation of powers in the State and the principle of inde­pendence of judges. 21. The Court did not find the arguments justified, because Law No. 26 of 10 March 2022 does not aim to evaluate magistrates, as the author of the complaint claims[...]. 23.[....], the Court holds that the prior assessment of the in­tegrity of candidates for the office of member of the SCM, the SCP, as well as candidates for the office of member in their specialized bodies does not interfere, per se, with the principle of independence of justice and the principle of separation of powers in the State. 24. For this reason, the Court did not consider the incidence of Articles 6 and 116 of the Constitution in relation to the criticism raised by the author of the complaint regarding the existence of the verification mechanism in itself.” 99