dia literacy or judicial reform projects, could further foster coherence between the internal and external democracy agenda. Lastly, the EU should ensure that policy areas such as migra­tion, with regard to which the EU has been known to turn a blind eye to violations of fun­damental rights, are guided by the same dem­ocratic principles that the EU promotes in its external funding. 5. Deploy flexible instruments for crisis situations and democratic opportunities The EU should use the flexible, rapid-response financial instruments to bolster democracy, civ­ic engagement and the rule of law, for instance during crises or unique windows for democratic advancement. Emergency funds such as Cata­lystEU or the Ukraine Reserve Fund should in­tegrate grant schemes dedicated to support for democracy. This means treating democratic erosion, disinformation campaigns and shrink­ing civic space as genuine crises, on a par with other emergencies in areas such as security or the economy, earmarking portions of crisis funding for targeted democratic initiatives. Such instruments should feature streamlined access and transparent oversight, enabling both established and grassroots organisations to respond quickly when democratic institu­tions come under threat or when opportunities for reform and civic mobilisation arise. Incorpo­rating clear language around support for de­mocracy within crisis funding could ensure that these mechanisms remain focused and protect­ed from political repurposing. When it comes to the external funding instru­ments, negotiators could also introduce dedi­cated flexible tools, such as a»Fund for Demo­cratic Openings« to empower the EU to seize opportunities for democratisation abroad, in­cluding in transitional or post-crisis environ­ments. 31 In addition, the scope of crisis-re­sponse and flexible instruments should explicit­ly cover electoral assistance and parliamentary support, enabling rapid aid for election process­es, institutional stability and civil society. 6. Enforce conditionality mechanisms rigorously The EU must commit to strictly enforce its con­ditionality mechanism, ensuring that access to funds is tied directly to compliance with the rule of law and fundamental values. Given the polar­ised political landscape, several EU member states are likely to contest the Commission’s as­sessments. To address the growing tension between the Commission’s twin roles – policy initiator and Guardian of the Treaties – the EU should strengthen institutional»Chinese walls« between legislative leadership and oversight and enforce­ment. This could include the establishment of an independent agency tasked specifically with legislative enforcement and infringement proce­dures. It could also include allocating sufficient staff and financial resources to the Commission services in charge of the monitoring and en­forcement of the conditionality mechanism. Lastly, clear guidelines should be developed for the future use of frozen funds, redirecting them proactively to independent oversight bodies, civil society organisations and independent media in cases of democratic backsliding. Conclusion Negotiations on the MFF 2028–2034 offer a criti ­cal opportunity for the EU to anchor democracy as a strategic investment and»public infrastruc­ture« on which all other EU policies rely. In prac­tice, this means predictable, protected funding across multiple budget lines; allocated funding for civil society and political foundations; align­ment between the EU budget and the Commis­31  Sam van der Staak(2025): Democracy assistance in the next MFF: a first impression, International IDEA(July). Conclusion 15