one of the long-term potential benefits of EU ac­tion. 10 At the same time, acting with respect to subsidiarity is more efficient, as EU capacities are not infinite, and Member States are better placed to know their own unique strengths and priorities. In the case of industrial policy, many competi­tiveness challenges, such as energy security and supply chain resilience, are transnational in na­ture and justify the need for EU collaboration and coordination. For example, with regard to the transition towards renewable energy sources, an interconnected energy grid infrastructure helps balance variable production, reduce sys­tem costs and attract investment. 11 This prompt­ed the EU to set an interconnection target for Member States. 12 Regional and local governments often do not have structures and fora in place to coordinate across national boundaries to address transna­tional issues. A coordinated, transnational re­sponse that matches the EU’s ambition on com­petitiveness is unlikely to be achieved by Mem­ber State action alone. Only coordination at EU level can ensure a strategic, pan-European over­view that makes the most of national and re­gional strengths, and enhances synergies be­tween policy goals. Coordination at EU level would also reduce the fragmentation of resources and efforts, and facilitate knowledge exchange between Member States and sectors, from fundamental research to businesses. 13 Additionally, several EU-level strategies and tools already exist to coordinate and support EU industries. However, these ef­forts also tend to work in siloes, focusing on ­different policies, and are implemented and monitored within different Directorate Generals (DGs). 14 The CCT could link these initiatives, act­ing as a centralised coordination structure to en­sure horizontal as well as vertical coordination. For all these reasons, the response to boost competitiveness needs to be coordinated at EU level to be truly effective. A multilevel govern­ance approach can ensure that this coordination is successful while remaining in line with the principle of subsidiarity, and leaving national governments to decide on priorities and imple­ment policies in line with their own national contexts. 10  European Parliamentary Research Service.(2023). Mapping the cost of non-Europe report: Theoretical foundations and practical considerations. European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2023/747436/EPRS_STU(2023)747436_EN.pdf. 11  COM(2025) 570 final. Communication from the Commission. A ­dynamic EU Budget for the priorities of the future – The Multiannual ­Financial Framework 2028–2034. European Commission. https://eur-­lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0570&­qid=­1753978048542. 12  European Commission.(n.d.). Electricity interconnection targets. Retrieved on October 31, 2025, from https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/­infrastructure/electricity-interconnection-targets_en. 13  European Commission.(2024). Science, research and innovation performance of the EU 2024: A competitive Europe for a sustainable future. ­Directorate General for Research and Innovation. European Commission. https://apre.it/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/SRIP-2024.pdf. 14  Bertram, L., Hafele, J., Kiecker, S.,& Korinek, L.(2024). A unified industrial strategy for the EU: Industrial policy recommendation to promote decarbonisation, competitiveness and cohesion in Europe(p. 27). The Foundation for European Progressive Studies. https://feps-europe.eu/wp-­content/ uploads/2024/12/A-unified-industrial-strategy-for-the-EU.pdf. 6 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.