gas phase-out target to match the country’s EU commitments, while national planning framework foresees the building of new gas infrastructure that will remain in operation well beyond 2035. Since the launch of its green transition plan, the Mitsotakis government has overseen the commissioning of two new gas-fired generation plants, with one more in construction and more in the planning phase. It has also inaugurated a second LNG terminal, with at least three more currently under consideration. Finally, the administration revived its hydrocarbon exploration programme, doubling the areas licensed for offshore drilling with new tenders run in 2025. The growing role of gas in the national energy strategy, although foreshadowed in the NECP, reflects a broader policy shift which is already having a tangible effect on the country’s ability to meet its green transition commitments. Policy pivot Two developments played a key role in shifting the policy balance since 2019. The first is the rising cost of energy, which has contributed to persistent inflationary pressures on Greek households and industry, starting at the end of 2021. The second is the re-election of President Trump, and the geopolitical realignments this has caused across the region. High living costs have emerged as the biggest concern for Greek voters and the most persistent policy challenge for the New Democracy government, which has seen its popularity slump since starting a second term in 2023. In spite of 9.5 billion euros – equivalent to over 5% of GDP – channelled into support measures at the height of the energy crisis, Greece still has the highest energy poverty levels in Europe. In 2024, 32% of households were in arrears on their utility bills compared to the European figure of 6.9%, while 19% reporting inability to heat their homes adequately compared to 9% across Europe(European Commission 2025). The cost-of-living issue tops the political agenda for the majority of Greeks, who consistently rate the government’s economic performance as a failure in surveys, despite the improvement in headline figures. Production costs have also risen as a result of rising energy bills, resulting in intensifying political pressure from Greek industry. Mitsotakis has chosen to tackle the domestic calls for lower energy prices by referring the problem to Brussels. In a series of public statements, he has called for market reform and increased investment in connectivity, but has also made pleas for the EU to loosen emissions targets and to allow investment in gas infrastructure. In a letter to the European Commission President penned in January 2025, the Greek PM argued that“we need to empower European companies to invest in gas projects and infrastructure, and to sign contracts that guarantee European access to global supplies”(Kathimerini 2025b). In a more recent op-ed in the Financial Times, he argued that “the green transition cannot be an end in itself”, adding that,“if we must accept some emissions for a bit longer to save our industries or to maintain social cohesion, so be it” (Hellenic Republic Office of the Prime Minister 2025a). The second inflection point occurred in November 2025, when Athens hosted the meeting of the Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation(P-TEC). The gathering included several members of the Trump administration with responsibility for the energy agenda as well as a large trade delegation from the US oil and gas industry. A number of deals were announced, all pertaining to hydrocarbons, while the timing of the forum was significant, as it coincided with the opening of the COP-30 climate summit, which Greece and the US both snubbed. From the podium of the P-TEC conference, participants sketched out a new energy architecture for southeast Europe and the eastern Mediterranean, revolving mostly around the displacement of Russian gas by US LNG across southeast and central Europe, as well as Moldova and Ukraine. In his address, Mitsotakis highlighted Greece’s “strategic bet” on natural gas and described that the country as“the natural entry point for US LNG to replace Russian gas in the region”(Hellenic Republic Office of the Prime Minister 2025b). The event marked the start of a closer alignment of Greek energy policy with the Trump agenda, pushing back against climate targets while supporting a greater role for hydrocarbons. Aside from the commercial angle, the Greek PM views P-TEC as a geopolitical turning point, cementing relations with the Trump administration and promising – in their perception at least- an implicit security guarantee against territorial claims by Turkey. Greece is not unique among European countries in revising its stance on the green transition in light of the shifting geopolitical circumstances and the internal political tensions fanned by the energy crisis. Mitsotakis is, however, the first European leader to align so closely with the Trump energy agenda – a move driven both by the need to find a point of convergence with the new administration in Washington, and by the search for a new economic narrative in the post-RRF era. Although Mitsotakis’s policy pivot certainly does not amount to a full convergence with the climate-sceptic views expressed by some of the US policy-makers at P-TEC, it exemplifies what he describes as a more “pragmatic” approach to the green transition. This is also evident in other policy choices made in recent months. In addition to hailing the progress in attracting hydrocarbon investments, the Greek PM welcomed the EU’s retreat on the EU Emission Trading System ETS2 cap­Is the Greek green transition running out of power? 4