aged mask use, promoted mass gatherings, endorsed unproven treatments and spread misinformation. The human toll was catastrophic: Brazil recorded over 700,000 COVID-related deaths, second only to the Unit ­ed States. In response, the National Congress – particu ­larly the Senate – established a Parliamentary Commis ­sion of Inquiry(CPI) to investigate the federal govern ­ment’s handling of the crisis and played a prominent role in this response. The CPI brought together actors from across the political spectrum and played a pivotal role in documenting nearly two years of federal miscon­duct. This legislative initiative evolved into a broader multi-actor coalition, marked by strong alignment with extra-parliamentary forces, such as initiatives launched by civil society organisations and major media outlets, including the Consortium of Press Vehicles initiative, which independently monitored pandemic data and pro­moted an early pro-vaccination campaign. It also re ­shaped the political landscape in advance of the 2022 elections, providing a platform for public scrutiny and opposition mobilisation. The pandemic thus became a moment of collective learning, forcing institutions, soci­ety and the media to confront the realities of far right governance. It laid the groundwork for cross-sector alli ­ances and more coherent counterstrategies that would become crucial in later crises. (ii) The 2022 presidential election: contesting power and protecting institutions The second turning point came during the 2022 presi ­dential elections. Bolsonaro took advantage of his in ­cumbency to expand his electoral appeal, introducing targeted social programmes and discretionary budget mechanisms, such as the»secret budget«, to secure legislative and voter support(Tanscheit and Barbosa 2023). His campaign was anchored by the influential »Beef, Bible, and Bullets« coalition, which consistently commanded around 30 per cent of the electorate. Alongside this mobilisation, Bolsonaro escalated at­tacks on the Supreme Federal Court(STF) and other institutions, repeatedly alleging electoral fraud and judicial bias. These unfounded claims were intended to delegitimise his opponent, Luiz Inácio Lula da Sil ­va, and to suggest that electoral defeat would not be accepted. During this period, political leaders and parties played a central role in forming a broad pro-democracy coalition that transcended traditional ideological divides. Simultaneously, the judiciary – particularly the Superior Electoral Court(TSE) and the STF – acted decisively to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process, countering disinformation and ensuring institutional stability. The coordinated efforts by partisan and judicial actors, supported by civil society and the media, were essential in defend­ing democratic norms and upholding electoral legiti­macy against an incumbent president who was ac­tively undermining them. (iii) The 8 January 2023 attacks on Brasília: a breaking point The most acute crisis occurred on 8 January 2023, just days after Lula’s inauguration. Whipped up by months of disinformation and anti-democratic rhetoric, thou­sands of Bolsonaro supporters stormed and vandalised the Congress, the Supreme Court and the Presidential Palace, mirroring the 6 January 2021 insurrection in the United States. Bolsonaro’s refusal to concede defeat, his abrupt departure from Brazil days before the end of his term, and his absence from the formal handover of power(symbolised by his refusal to pass on the presi­dential sash) was intended to signal to his supporters that the election had been»stolen«. In the immediate aftermath, however, the executive branch acted with re­markable speed to restore order, reestablish control over the federal capital, and ensure institutional conti­nuity. The judiciary, particularly the STF and the Feder ­al Police, then assumed a more prominent role, leading investigations and prosecutions and securing the con­victions of those involved in the attacks. Following Bol ­sonaro’s conviction, renewed attempts within Congress to grant amnesty to him and his allies sparked massive social mobilisation; civil society organisations exerted decisive pressure that ultimately forced legislators to backtrack and uphold due legal process. Together, these actions demonstrated a dual approach to democratic defence, both reactive and proactive. So what works and what doesn’t? Lessons from Brazil Though initially fragmented, Brazil’s democratic forces coalesced around processes of demarcation and con­frontation, especially when accommodation proved po­litically costly. Parliamentary actors(especially political parties and legislative coalitions) led the response dur ­ing the pandemic and 2022 elections, playing a central role in building anti-authoritarian alliances. Over time, extra-parliamentary actors, including civil society, me­dia and judicial institutions, increasingly complemented and reinforced these efforts. In the aftermath of the 2022 election and the 8 January attacks, these non­state actors assumed a more prominent role, reflecting a shift in the locus of democratic self-defence from for­mal politics to broader societal mobilisation. Brazil’s experience demonstrates that effective respons­es to the far right require coordination across institu­tional boundaries, strategic timing, and a willingness to confront authoritarian tendencies head-on. It also sug ­gests that proactive measures, rooted in democratic ed­ucation, coalition-building and institutional reform, are essential to prevent democratic backsliding. Taken together, these three moments – pandemic deni­alism, electoral delegitimisation and the 8 January in ­How to counter the far-right: lessons from Brazil 3