emergency hotlines and pro-bono rosters. These are not substitutes for public services; they are stopgaps that prevent total social unravelling while preserving the social capital a TJ process will need. Finally, there is local de-escalation. Tribal leaders, youth mediators, and ward-level committees broker short truces to open corridors, repair boreholes, or evacuate hospitals. 24 Women activists drive neighbourhood-to-neighbourhood messaging that reframes“honour” away from retaliation and toward the protection of life. These small instances of peace rarely make headlines, but they save lives now and seed the relational groundwork for any formal process later. 5. Challenges and roadblocks Repression has been cyclical and costly. Under Bashir, independent associations were closed and activists detained or disappeared; during the 2013 austerity protests, security forces used live fire, killing scores. 25 After 2019, the law recognized TJ objectives but implementation lagged; the 2021 coup restored a climate of fear. Since April 2023, both main belligerents have targeted civic actors, commandeered NGO premises, and criminalized independent relief—further shrinking operational space and pushing many groups underground. 26 Documenting human rights abuses is extremely dangerous – those gathering evidence of war crimes may be targeted for elimination by perpetrators seeking to cover their tracks. Fragmentation is the shadow side of resilience. The civic field’s decentralization—so effective against authoritarian tactics—can hinder coherence when national frameworks or negotiation platforms need unified positions. Different charters and coalitions sometimes talk past each other; periphery voices can feel under-represented in Khartoum­centric debates. Resource scarcity compounds this: core funding has collapsed, banking channels are disrupted, compliance burdens are hard to meet in a war zone, and volunteers shoulder trauma and burnout. Exclusion from formal processes remains the norm. The 2020 Juba Peace Agreement’s justice chapter promised a Truth Commission, a Special Court for Darfur, and reparations—but those institutions never materialized before the coup, and implementation bodies were dominated by signatory armed groups. Women, youth, and victims’ associations—those most invested in justice—were under-represented. In current mediation tracks, civil society is too often relegated to“consultations at the margins.” Elite bargains among armed and political actors have proven brittle precisely because they lack civic ownership. Above all, impunity corrodes trust. From the Darfur atrocities of the 2000s to the 3 June 2019 Khartoum massacre—where more than one hundred protesters were killed—survivors have watched investigations stall and suspects retain power. 27 This history can breed cynicism and fatigue among the public and even among civil society activists themselves. Convincing victims to participate in yet another commission or to come forward with testimonies can be difficult when previous efforts yielded no closure or accountability. There is a corresponding mistrust between civil society and power-holders: security forces often perceive justice-oriented civil society as a direct threat, and even some civilians in power may worry that pursuing justice could destabilize things. Overcoming this impasse – where calls for justice are heard not as destabilizing but as foundational to peace – is an ongoing struggle. Civil society must continually make the case that peace and justice are not in zero-sum opposition, and that addressing grievances is essential to prevent future conflict. 6. Policy recommendations International partners that stress their commitment to peace and civilian rule in Sudan need to support the practical work of locally-led civic organisations in Sudan and the region. Diplomatically, international partners should press all parties to the conflict to halt arrests of activists and attacks on service hubs; reconstruction can only work if civic space is protected and those engaged in mutual aid are not persecuted for alleged cooperation with the RSF. They should use targeted sanctions more energetically against commanders credibly implicated in atrocities or obstruction of civic space and humanitarian access. Operationally, international partners should provide flexible funds to Sudanese organizations and diaspora-linked consortia able to move supplies and stipends into the country; back evidence preservation with secure tooling, hosting, and expert mentorship; and fund survivor services(gbv response, mental health). They should create funding programmes specifically to support civil society in its various forms, even if they are not formally registered to protect their operations in Sudan. In their programming, international partners should coordinate with each other and avoid adding to the fragmentation through initiatives competing for visibility. On the multilateral level, international partners should ensure the UN human rights mechanisms on Sudan continue to be mandated and receive sustained funding despite current cuts, making available voluntary pledges as needed. At the UN Security Council, they should ensure that the panel of experts on Sudan is able to work properly and advocate for an extension of the referral to the ICC to cover the whole country, not just Darfur. Finally, international partners that are in a position to do so should set up and support credible and coordinated track two mediation initiatives that provide confidential and structured space for dialogue that include diverse civic actors as well as those close to the warring parties. Mediation support should enable an informed dialogue on key contested issues, including transitional justice as part of any post-war order. The Role of Civil Society in Transitional Justice and Peace in Sudan. 4