Investing in the multilateral system Any global development agenda will also depend on a strong and effective multilateral system. The recent cri­sis in multilateralism has two dimensions. The first is the lack of political support in times of geopolitical fragmentation and unilateral measures, especially by more powerful players in the international community. The second is the funding crisis, which affects the UN system in particular. Most financial support to the UN system comes from richer countries’ development budg­ets, i.e., it counts as ODA and it will be reduced if coun­tries cut back on ODA. On the other hand, the system of assessed contributions that funds the regular UN budget is very similar to GPI, in the sense that it fulfills the criteria that everyone contributes, benefits, and co-decides. As Member States are unwilling to provide sufficient funds to multilateral bodies, a Beyond 2030 framework should broaden the financing instruments available to the multilateral system, e.g., by introducing global solidarity taxes or by issuing and permitting broader use of Special Drawing Rights(SDRs). Countering shocks: broader use of SDRs Beyond the financing gap, the economic and finan­cial shocks caused by multiple crises over the past decade played their part in derailing the Agenda 2030. The COVID-19 crisis unveiled a financial divide: While richer countries have almost unlimited access to capital on financial markets, and could finance large fiscal deficits at near-zero interest rates, poorer countries had either no access at all, or at prohibi­tively high costs. Hence, their inability to provide economic stimulus and sustain social protection pro­grams in times of crisis. A lesson for the Beyond 2030 framework is that more resilience throughout the system is desperately needed, and that the inter­national community needs a stronger global financial safety net—with fair access for everyone—to buffer shocks. Perhaps the most relevant countermeasure during the COVID-19 crisis was the issuance of SDRs worth $650 billion by the IMF to its members. This provid ­ed a much-needed liquidity boost. The IMF can cre­ate SDRs ex nihilo, and without clear restrictions on the quantity. To unleash the full potential of SDRs, several reforms are needed. As Andrés Arauz argued in a paper for Latindadd and the Center for Economic and Policy Research(CEPR), SDRs are currently trapped by ac­counting conventions and a dysfunctional issuance process(Arauz, 2025). The IMF needs a decision by its board of governors to issue SDRs, and it must al­locate to its members according to their quota. The first requirement causes avoidable delays(18 months during the COVID-19 crisis), while the second implies that allocation is not needs-based. The most power­ful economies take home the lion’s share of any new SDR allocation. The United States receives the most, and Germany receives a larger share than all 56 Afri ­can countries combined. The IMF should set up a preapproved SDR mecha­nism with automatic triggers and clear allocation for SDR issuance. This would allow for much speedier allocation. Moreover, the IMF could reform its ac­counting conventions to classify SDRs as debt-like li­abilities rather than an equity counterpart to uncon­ditional reserve assets, since this classification makes it harder for countries to transfer SDRs into their na­tional budget. Contingent SDR issuance does not require a modifi­cation of the IMF Articles of Agreement. Changing the definition of SDRs back from debt to equity is simply a technical issue that could be done under the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics Committee (BOPCOM). However, it might face resistance from influential members as it affects how SDR holdings appear on members’ balance sheets. A political man­date comes from the Compromiso de Sevilla, the po­litical agreement adopted at the FfD4 conference, which invites the IMF to design an SDR playbook to provide operational guidance and strengthen the role of SDRs, and to supplement existing reserve assets with SDR allocations when the need arises(United Nations, 2025a, para. 54). Financing for Development in the Beyond 2030 framework One lesson learned from the Agenda 2030 process in the early 2010s is that the separation of the process that designs the goals from the process that designs the financial means was not such a good idea. In 2013/2014, the SDGs were negotiated by the Open Working Group on SDGs of the UN General Assembly (International Institute for Sustainable Development, n.d.). In parallel, the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing(IC­ESDF) laid the foundation for what was to become the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the few financing commitments that entered the SDGs under SDG 17. Actually, just a tiny fraction of the ICESDF’s recom­Financing Development for a Beyond 2030 Agenda 7