mendations were transformed into SDGs, which explains the mismatch between goals and means from which the Agenda 2030 has suffered from the start(United Nations, 2014). The Beyond 2030 process should negotiate and de ­sign the goals and the means in an integrated manner, from the beginning. A strong Beyond 2030 financing framework implies that the international financial institutions(IFIs) play along— in particular, the Bretton Woods Institutions, but also re­gional development banks. An unresolved challenge in global economic governance is that the UN and IFIs have separate governance bodies and are hesitant to comply with agreements made at the UN. Commitments related to the IMF and the World Bank in the Compromiso de Se­villa use the wording:“we encourage the boards of inter­national financial institutions to … XYZ” because the IFIs’ more powerful member countries(and their own staff and management) insisted that the UN cannot make binding decision on their mandates. The UN and IFIs have the same member states, however. It is the responsibility of the member states to ensure policy coherence. The split often starts at home, in capitals, where foreign ministries or line ministries lead negotiations at the UN, while finance ministries are in charge of negotiations at IFIs and the G20. This division must be overcome. The commitment made in Sevilla for all countries to appoint a focal point for Financing for Development aims to pro­mote coherence. However, the position must have the au­thority and status to coordinate and ensure the compli­ance of all ministries. It should be similar to the“sherpa” role in the G20 process, which is typically held by a senior officer in the head of state/government office who enjoys the backing of the head of state. The UN has also started to build a network of these national focal points, which could become a useful body for technical work as well as policy discussions on the Beyond 2030 financing frame ­work. Implementing the necessary financial reforms—on a scale that is commensurate with a universal and compre­hensive development agenda—will require the support of political leaders around the world. In 2015, we had their commitment for the goals, but not for the means. This mistake should not be repeated beyond 2030. Policy recommendations: → Conduct tax reforms that move toward more progres­sive systems, such as better taxation of wealth, high in­comes, and corporate profits, and increasing tax-to-GDP ratios, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. The ongoing negotiations on a UN tax convention at the UN General Assembly have created a unique oppor­tunity for international cooperation in this area, but Member States’ appetite for reform varies widely. → Reduce borrowing costs through reforms to credit ra­ting systems and financial regulation(including Basel III), and by making greater use of SDRs. The FfD4 con ­ference and the South African G20 presidency have brought this issue to the attention of the international community. There is a lot of activity in the area of CRAs, while support for SDR reform has waned and the debate on reforming financial regulation is still in its infancy. → Reform the system of international public finance transfers“beyond ODA,” taking into account best prac­tices at regional and national levels. Traditional ODA has lost much public support and funding, while regio­nal alternatives are more stable, and the GPI has at­tracted some interest. → Align more closely the processes of agreeing on goals and means in international negotiations leading to a Beyond 2030 framework, and the promotion of policy coherence. There is widespread acknowledgment that the means side of the new framework needs to be strengthened. The design of the framework beyond 2030 is expected to begin with the SDG Summit in 2027. 8 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.