messages from the international community, but rather clear and unambiguous ones. The prerequisite for this to happen, however, is that the numerous actors in the international arena agree on a common approach. Instead, however, efforts by governments and international organisations have thus far been influenced by particularistic interests as well as domestic political pressure creating the need to demonstrate rapid action. These factors have not only diverted attention from the objective of achieving peace in the region, they have also created a veritable cacophony of mediation offers that provides the parties to the conflict with an avenue for avoiding the international community’s potential pressure. What follows from all this is a clear need for a realignment of international efforts for a peaceful solution of the conflicts in the tri-border area. In this context it is of great importance to truly engage all the actors in a common structure and not, for instance, to equate the international community with the Western world. China, Libya, the African Union and League of Arab States may be difficult partners for the West at times, but no lasting solution to the problems in the region is conceivable without them. The aim should be to create a single coordinating group bringing together all the main actors under a clear leadership structure, which assigns clearly delineated tasks to individual countries and organisations in accordance with their respective strengths(e.g. maintaining contact with a certain group) and within the framework of a common strategy. Re-politicising Peace Efforts Such an approach would also facilitate a political approach to resolving the conflicts in the region. Experience with AMIS(African Union Mission in Sudan) and UNAMID(United Nations/ African Union Mission in Darfur) has shown that a peace mission deployed against the will of the conflict parties not only fails to accomplish its objectives, but will instead become part of the conflict itself. In the case of Chad, one can even argue that the very announcement of the EUFOR mission has motivated rebel groups to launch a new coup attempt before the full deployment of the mission and has thus ultimately contributed to an escalation of the crisis. The mandates of both Darfur missions, as well as MINURCAT(United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad), do not include any political component that, besides mitigating symptoms, could contribute to the solution of the crisis’ root causes. As lasting peace in the region is only possible through a political solution, this objective should once again be brought to the fore. For Sudan this could mean, for example, a greater emphasis on the political components of the UN mission stationed in the South and assigned with the task of monitoring and implementing the CPA (UNMIS, United Nations Mission in Sudan). In view of the most recent coup attempts in Chad, the mandates of MINURCAT and EUFOR (European Union Force) should be thoroughly reviewed. Both mandates are restricted to the military conflict concentrated in the east and completely ignore the country’s fundamental political crisis. French support for President Idriss Deby in his fight against rebel groups, both in the east in November 2007 and during the coup attempt staged in February 2008, have convinced the rebels that the French-dominated EUFOR is by no means neutral, but rather meant to stabilise the existing regime. EUFOR has thus become a party to the conflict from the very outset and may have to dedicate more attention to its own security needs than to its actual mission. The EU’s reputation as a neutral mediator is at stake, and it should quickly put a halt to its uncritical implementation of French objectives. The EU should furthermore improve coordination between its existing initiatives, which have so far been running parallel to one another. Even though the mandate of the EU Special Representative for Sudan has been expanded to include assistance for EUFOR, no provision has been made for his involvement in the political dialogue between the government and political opposition, which has received significant support by the EU Commission. In the current atmosphere of increased political repression, the protection of this dialogue and its participants is of utmost importance and should thus be an integral part of the MINURCAT mandate. 3