and net commitments for fiscal contributions amounting to US$17,136 million (65.8% of GDP in 2018). State commitments will grow steadily because of the introduction of new benefits(BET, BEP, and BL) and the Solidarity Guarantee Account(CGS); the balance of the CGS shows a growing deficit since 2027 making it financially unsustainable(Melinsky, 2018). The foregoing shows the flaws in the design of the 1996 structural reform, aggravated by subsequent state policies that—in order to reduce the fiscal deficit—financed the cost of the transition with transfers from the private system fund(SAP) at the cost of reducing pensions amount, 91 as well as the ineffectiveness of the 2017 re-re ­form to restore the sustainability of the system(Mesa-Lago and Rivera, 2020). 7. Increase in the Role of the State and AFP Decline All re-reforms increased the role of the government either by the transfer from the private to the public system and/or by creating/expanding the ben­efits financed by the state, together with new public management agencies. Argentina created a Bicameral Commission in Congress that monitors the pub­lic system funds and its evolution, receives annual reports from ANSES, and may make recommendations, but not binding; an advisory board of the public fund(also with no binding power) and other public agencies conduct exter­nal supervision, so there is no unified autonomous superintendence, as in the case of Chile. Supervisory agencies are weak and ANSES plays a predominant role. The Public Manager in Bolivia is autonomous, although it is supervised by a governmental agency, therefore, its real autonomy is not clear. The most serious problem it faced was the integration of the data from the two AFP, the Manager already administers and pays the universal non-contributory pension 91 This contradicts the FIAP’s statement(2020b: 5, 6) that“the collective ownership of the[PAYG] funds exposes the pension resources to the danger that they will be used for purposes other than the objectives of the pension system,” also, they face the risk“that the portfolio structures are influenced by political pressure, allocating resources to suboptimal investments that are rightly[sic] detrimental to obtaining adequate capital returns.” This happened not only in the Salvadoran private system, but also in the fully-funded pillar of the Argentine mixed system at the end of the 1990s, before the re-reform, when the superintendence of the AFP pushed the latter to change instruments traded in dollars to pesos, then the devaluation occurred and the fund value contracted dramatically. 149