THE ALBANIAN PUBLIC'S TRUST IN SECURITY: STUMBLING BLOCKS TO EU NEGOTIATIONS The SIS is dependent on the Prime Minister institutionally 22 , but its director is appointed by the President. This creates a system of institutional co-dependency and a general de jure separation of responsibilities to prevent the centralization of power. The SIS reports to both the President and the PM. In practice, the SIS has always been at the forefront of political control and political struggle. An element worthy of mention to better understand the problems related to executive oversight of this institution is the case of the institutional and political conflict between the former director of the SIS(Visho Ajazi Lika) and the executive government. Representatives of the government made constant claims that the SIS and its director was not providing the government with proper reports and was withholding information. The government frequently claimed that Lika was not loyal to the state, but loyal to the leaders of the opposition parties since he was appointed during their tenure(and was previously a deputy minister for their government). 23 Bizarrely, Lika quit his position in 2017 and the government appointed him as Albania's ambassador to NATO. 24 Whatever the truth in this situation, the fact that what the government claimed, in this case, was probably true indicates that the exertion of political and personal control, as opposed to institutional control and oversight, is a problem within the structures of the SIS. 3.3. Parliamentary Control and Oversight The parliament enjoys control and oversight of the intelligence institutions based on both the approval and implementation of laws, as well as oversight that involves annual reports that are supposed to be carried out by the director of each institution, both the SIS and the DISA. Parliament has ex-ante control and oversight based on the adoption of legislation and budgets. It also exercises ex-post control and oversight based on holding the intelligence institutions accountable for their performance regarding the implementation of budgets and the law. The laws of both the SIS and the DISA both have provisions for such matters. Furthermore, the law on SIS provides for the creation of a permanent sub-commission within the commission on national security in the parliament to report on all matters related to its activities, but this is not actually in place. The SIS Director reports to the commission on national security at least once per year. The reporting is done mostly with closed doors, with little information being passed to the public. 25 22 Article 4, Law no. 8391, Dated 28.10.1998. On the State Security Service . As Amended. 23 Article containing these claims by a representative of the government: https://shqiptarja.com/lajm/braho-ldquo-forcat-e-erreta-rdquo-visho-br-ajazi-nuk-ka-informuar-ramen?r=app 24 Article on the NATO website on Visho Ajazi Lika: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/who_is_who_151506.htm 25 Article 7, Law no. 8391, Dated 28.10.1998. On the State Security Service . As Amended. 31