THE ALBANIAN PUBLIC'S TRUST IN SECURITY: STUMBLING BLOCKS TO EU NEGOTIATIONS 3.4. Oversight from Independent Institutions In this section, we will analyze the oversight exercised by the SSAI and the Ombudsperson. The Ombudsperson is legally mandated to control the implementation of laws regarding the respect of basic human rights and freedoms. The Ombudsperson has the right to conduct interviews with SIS staff, inspect the faculties of SIS establishments, as well as inspect classified information. Nevertheless, the actual number of Ombudsperson cases of complaints and reports on matters of the SIS has been limited. Most of the cases brought forth by this institution are related to labor disputes. The activities of the DISA are not part of the oversight of the Ombudsperson. The SSAI is the highest institution tasked with the auditing of the expenses of the intelligence services. 26 SSAI reports include findings and analyses of expenses for the SIS, whereas the auditing of the DISA is conducted in a special section within the analysis of the expenses of the MoD. A recurring problem within these analyses is the control of spending done in the form of classified procurement of covert operations, as these elements are part of public secrets. 3.5. Control and Oversight from the Judiciary System The judiciary exercises control and oversight of the intelligence institutions through decisions taken by the courts. However, this control has been rarely exercised by the highest courts either in matters of constitutionality(the Constitutional Court) or matters of law(the Supreme Court). Most cases pertaining in some way to the intelligence services have been related to labor and pension disputes by employees of these institutions. 3.6. Control and Oversight from the Institution Created by the Justice Reform In the same manner, as the aforementioned security institutions, the intelligence institutions are also subject to control and oversight by the institutions of the justice reform on all matters on Article 75/a of the Penal Code, related to active and passive corruption in positions of state. The SIS is also expected to cooperate with the NBI and SPO in any case that they require the aid of the intelligence institutions- to receive necessary information on matters of verifying cases of abuses of power, to verify the wealth of state officials, or to verify cases of money laundering. 27 26 Article 162 of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania. 27 Law no. 95/2016 “For the Organization and Functioning of Institutions that Combat Corruption and Organized Crime” , Article 50& 51. 32