THE ALBANIAN PUBLIC'S TRUST IN SECURITY: STUMBLING BLOCKS TO EU NEGOTIATIONS 4. Conclusions Albania has the legal framework with the necessary provisions that serve to provide the most important democratic oversight of the security institutions by a wide array of both executive, legislative, judiciary, and independent bodies. The full utilization of these powers from these institutions, as well as the existence of solid results from the independent institutions(in particular the institutions established by the justice reforms), remains problematic. 3.7. Armed Forces With regards to accountability of the Armed Forces, there is a notable inconsistency between the formal and de jure elements of this control and oversight, and the actual practice. The control and oversight exercised by the parliament have been minimal at best, with the parliamentary groups lacking the will to exercise their accountability vis a vis the government, as well as there being a general lack of resources accorded to defense. The dominance of the executive over the parliament does not help this problem either. More resources should be accorded to the independent oversight institution to increase their effectiveness. 3.8. The State Police The control and oversight of the State Police are largely dominated by the MoI, followed by the CoM, with very little parliamentary oversight being effectuated over the workings, challenges, or problems faced by this important institution. There have been few cases where parliament has ever challenged any decision taken or law approved with relation to the workings of the police(even the controversial law that empowered the Operation"Force of the law"). The level of oversight conducted by the independent institutions has not been productive. The SSAI has provided many analyses of police finances that speak in harsh tones about great losses incurred to the budget by expenses claimed by the police. The Ombudsperson has consistently raised concerns and accusations against the workings of the State Police, in particular regarding crowd management. In response, the executive has consistently claimed that these institutions are largely politicized and controlled by the opposition. We must also analyze the oversight and control created by the justice reform institutions. The NBI is yet to be established, and we can therefore not provide proper analysis on this matter until the full structure of the reform has been rendered operational. On the other hand, the police evaluation conducted by the Outer Evaluation Committee has been particularly slow, which makes the evaluation of the whole structure of the State Police a very elongated process. 33