Türkiye in Southeast Europe – A View from Bulgaria Marian Karagyozov Introduction The region of Southeast Europe(SEE) has a complex strategic architecture. This is because a number of vectors of influence traditionally intersect here: European, Russian, Atlantic, Islamic(mainly Türkiye, but recently also other players, such as the United Arab Emirates). Secondly, while most countries in Southeast Europe are members of NATO, fewer are members of the European Union. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia are not NATO members, either, and none of the countries of the so-called Western Balkans are EU members. Furthermore, EU membership seems scarcely realistic in the medium term for any of these countries. EU enlargement came to a halt in the region with Croatia’s accession in 2013. Currently, despite instrumentalising EU integration in the past to gain legitimacy both at home and abroad, Western Balkan leaders do not seem to have the political will to push for EU accession, as it would threaten the personalised power structures they have built up over time. The weakening of any prospect of EU membership has given many of these leaders more incentive to cultivate closer ties with other countries, including Russia, China, Türkiye and the UAE. In response, the EU’s interest in the region tends to spike whenever its relative disengagement coincides with the growing influence of other geopolitical actors. The EU’s most recent engagement with the region was driven almost entirely by geopolitical considerations in the context of the war in Ukraine and its own standoff with Moscow. Regrettably, it lacks any meaningful focus on democratisation within the countries of the region. In this context, Türkiye is seeking to expand its role in the region. Ankara is pursuing a comprehensive strategy that combines elements of both soft and hard power, enabling it to offset relative weaknesses in certain areas. Türkiye as a key player in Balkan politics Türkiye has free trade agreements(FTA) with all Balkan countries. From the standpoint of economic engagement with Ankara, the peninsula could be divided in two subregions: the five EU Member States 1 and the Western Balkans. 2 Three of the EU Members(Bulgaria, Greece and Romania) enjoy the lion’s share of trade with Türkiye in absolute volume(67 per cent of Turkish exports). From 2010 to 2020, Türkiye ranked among the top ten exporters of goods to Southeast European(SEE) countries, not including Greece and Croatia. Türkiye was the second­biggest exporter of goods to Kosovo, fourth to Albania, fifth to Bulgaria and sixth to Slovenia. In the opposite direction, SEE countries do not rank among the top ten exporters of goods to Türkiye. Ankara runs a positive trade balance with the Balkan region. Türkiye is a significant export destination for Bulgaria; 8 per cent of total Bulgarian goods exports went to Türkiye. Bulgaria remains very reliant on Türkiye’s economic growth trends(Türbedar 2022). Since 2000, Türkiye’s investments in Romania have exceeded 7 billion US dollars and approach 2 billion US dollars in Bulgaria(Ekinci 2019). In the Western Balkans, Serbia is the main Turkish trade partner and attracts the biggest share of Turkish foreign direct investments(FDI). In 2010–2020, Turkish FDI in the Republic of North Macedonia amounted to 353 million euros(€)(11.5 per cent of the total), ranking second. Ankara is among the five countries with the largest investments in Albania and Kosovo. If services contracts are included, Turkish investments in Albania reach 3.5 billion US dollars. They are calculated strategically and include ownership of the country’s second largest bank, hydropower plants, an iron melting plant, as well as telecom operator ALBtelecom. 3 This gives Türkiye access to sensitive infrastructure. In Kosovo, Turkish banks have an 18 per cent share in the sector and a Turkish company is the owner of the electricity grid operator. Türkiye is Bosnia and Herzegovina’s eighth largest trading partner(4.1 per cent of total trade volume). In fact, this falls far short of the two sides’ expectations. Türkiye invested around 250 million US dollars in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1994 to 2019, which puts it in eleventh place in terms of FDI. Since Montenegro’s NATO accession in 2017, the number of Turkish companies in the country has increased tenfold(Đurković 2022). An exact estimation of Turkish investments is difficult because UNCTAD and official 1  Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Romania, Slovenia. 2  Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Republic of North Macedonia(RNM), Serbia. 3  Formerly known as Eagle Mobile. 4 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.