Türkiye and Serbia: unyielding pragmatism Igor Novaković Introduction Türkiye is not an outsider to the Balkan region, unlike a number of other external actors. Geographically, it belongs to the Balkans, but it also shares deep historical and cultural ties rooted in the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, which once ruled much of the peninsula. The region’s Muslim populations have maintained connections with Türkiye, particularly after the fall of communism and during the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s. Furthermore, many Turkish citizens trace their ancestry to the(Western) Balkans, which makes Türkiye’s domestic political discourse especially sensitive to political developments in the region. During the 1990s, Türkiye largely aligned its approach to the Balkans with the policies of the United States and the European Union. This began to shift in the 2000s, however, when Ankara articulated a new foreign policy vision that emphasised the country’s geopolitical, economic and cultural potential. This shift created an opportunity to reassess and elevate Serbia–Türkiye relations. The process of re-evaluation was not without difficulties, but a new framework for cooperation emerged following the 2016 coup attempt in Türkiye, when Serbia was among the first states to express support for President Erdoğan. This gesture ushered in deeper cooperation, facilitated by Türkiye’s increasingly personalised foreign policy style, which Serbia embraced as it aligned well with its own »multi-vector« approach. This foundation has sustained bilateral relations ever since. Nonetheless, ongoing geopolitical transformations – most notably the second phase of Russia’s war in Ukraine – have reshaped Türkiye’s broader strategic orientation, a trend that had already been developing since the end of the Cold War in response to major international processes, such as EU enlargement, the Arab Spring and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Against this backdrop, this paper evaluates the scope and character of Serbia–Türkiye relations, their impact on Serbia’s national security and foreign policy priorities, and their role within Serbia’s broader multi-vector foreign policy framework. Serbia’s multi-vector foreign policy Ever since Kosovo’s proclamation of independence in 2008, Serbia has pursued a foreign policy markedly different from that of other EU candidate countries in the Western Balkans. While not abandoning its EU accession bid, Serbia sought alternatives to overcome the diplomatic isolation it faced in the late 2000s, strengthening relations above all with Russia and China. This search for external partners was also driven by the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, which highlighted the need for new sources of capital and investment. Additionally, Serbia’s openness to third countries was shaped by the legacy of the Yugoslav wars, the 1999 NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and other historical factors. In parallel, in 2007 Belgrade abandoned its previous ambition of joining NATO, declaring military neutrality toward»existing military alliances«(Rezolucija Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije o zaštiti suvereniteta, teritorijalnog integriteta i ustavnog poretka Republike Srbije) and limiting its cooperation with NATO to participation in the Partnership for Peace(PfP) programme (Republika Srbija – Prezentacioni dokument 2007). At that time, while searching for alternative partners, Serbia articulated a so-called»four-pillar« foreign policy, which emphasised relations with the EU, Russia, China and the United States, without establishing a formal hierarchy among them(Novakovic 2013). With the rise of a new political leadership under the Serbian Progressive Party and Aleksandar Vučić, this approach evolved into what became known as a»multi-vector« foreign policy. The policy signalled Serbia’s continued commitment to EU membership while simultaneously seeking to preserve and deepen relations with other global actors until accession was achieved. In domestic discourse, the Kosovo question – often framed as the preservation of»sovereignty and territorial integrity« – remained just as important as EU accession. In practice, this translated into intensified political, economic, energy and even defence cooperation with both Western and non-Western partners. Today, Serbia maintains free trade agreements with the EU, CEFTA 2006(as a member), China, the Eurasian Economic Union(having signed its first bilateral agreement with Russia in 2001), Türkiye and EFTA. In defence and military cooperation, beyond NATO and the EU, Serbia has developed extensive ties with Russia(partially suspended since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine) and has acquired military equipment from a wide range of suppliers, including Russia(tanks, aircraft, air-define systems), France (missiles, radars, aircraft) and China(air-defence systems). Serbia has also become one of the most active supporters 22 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.