Romania, the EU, and the Turkish Question Dragoș C. Mateescu Introduction: is Türkiye a reliable partner for the EU? The challenges posed by an aggressive Russia in eastern and southeastern Europe, or by other players, such as Iran and its proxies, in tandem with a potential US disengagement from Europe under Donald Trump’s second presidency, have led many to believe that Türkiye is slowly becoming a key foreign policy player. Its strategic influence in the region is increasing and Europe itself will have to rely on it more and more. But how accurate is this characterisation and how would this impact the regional policies of Romania and of the EU as a whole? The complex international arena presents major challenges today and most actors, whether large, medium or small, are undergoing similar transformations. Türkiye is also going through a process of transformation of its own. The increasing assertiveness of its ruling regime, in power since 2002, is evident not only in the neighbourhood, but also farther afield, in Central Asia and Africa. The broad geography of its ambitions means that Ankara needs to develop new foreign policy tools, new institutional structures and new connections. In turn, the EU, including Romania, needs to adjust its own objectives, behaviours and expectations on the international stage in order to cope. Our analysis must nevertheless start from the fact that Türkiye’s international posture is itself impacted by regional and especially domestic challenges. On the home front, the Ankara regime’s authoritarian turn has been increasingly evident over the past decade. This led to important losses for the ruling AKP-MHP alliance in the last local and parliamentary elections, and recent polls indicate the trend may be continuing in the same direction (Yeșilada 2025b). Following constitutional amendments narrowly approved in a controversial referendum in April 2017, decisions on government policy are now highly centralised in the presidential palace. But so is responsibility for falling living standards. Turkish citizens seem to be becoming increasingly aware not only of serious economic problems, but also of the even more serious problems concerning human rights and, especially, the functioning of the justice system. Although it is still difficult to envision an end to Erdoğan’s rule, it is becoming clear that it is facing a profound legitimacy crisis, which may soon have palpable consequences. The ongoing campaign against the opposition may nevertheless lead to its total elimination, with consequences difficult to imagine for a country that has never experienced a totalitarian dictatorship(Mateescu 2006). At the regional level, the situation is dominated in the north by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and in the south, by the demise of the Assad regime in Syria and Israel’s enhanced position, with the concomitant decline of Iranian influence. The United States must be considered the decisive factor in this transformation, and both Washington and the EU have a major interest in the broader political geography of relative Turkish influence. These two actors are, nevertheless, global players and their interests in Türkiye’s broader region are at a higher level. Last but not least, Russia’s aggressive approach leaves no doubt that it will remain the most serious threat to European security for the foreseeable future. In response to this threat and to the US re-evaluating its global commitments, the EU is working to develop its own defence strategy and capabilities through the€800 billion ReArm Europe Plan. Relevant economic actors in Türkiye, together with other non-EU actors, such as the United Kingdom, Canada or Norway, are viewed as potential participants in the process under the Safe Europe Instrument(SAFE) of the ReArm Europe Plan. It is in this complex and challenging context that Ankara is pursuing its own ambitious foreign policy goals, while also going through a process of transformation as a regional actor. The analysis of the role Türkiye will play in the region must consider the aspects sketched above and treat them analytically as variables. The main question is nevertheless whether the Turkish foreign policy goals and actions are going to be independent variables, likely to decisively determine various evolutions in the broader region, including in Southeast Europe, or whether Ankara will have to limit its ambitions and adapt to higher order EU and US imperatives, with even broader global implications. In this latter case, Türkiye would have to concede that it is not yet an actor capable of imposing its own agenda entirely, but one whose influence is limited by, and must adjust to the global interests of more powerful actors. The main argument here is that, contrary to some expert opinions, developments in Turkish domestic politics and in the region will tend to limit Ankara’s foreign policy ambitions and gradually reduce its role as a strategic actor. 14 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.