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A frontrunner without a functioning rule of law
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Formal Reform Without Institutional Transformation The rule of law is a central condition of Montenegros EU integration, covering judicial independence, anti­corruption mechanisms, and institutional accountability. Although extensive reforms aligned with EU standards have been adopted, the EC and civil society continue to highlight a gap between formal compliance and practical implementation. This gap is especially visible in the judiciary, where decades of reform have created a largely complete framework, but not stable independence, efficiency, or public trust. More than two decades after judicial reforms began, Montenegro has largely built the legal and institutional basis for an independent judiciary, yet changes remain mostly formal rather than substantive. The process has included constitutional amendments, the establishment of Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils, and multiple strategies and action plans. Still, key structural issues persist, including low public trust, slow proceedings, inconsistent case law, weak accountability, and political influence. Reforms have been largely driven by EU incentives, while domestic political will has been inconsistent. As a result, the judiciary is still widely seen as slow, inefficient, and vulnerable to external influence. Judicial System Under Structural Strain With the revised EU accession methodology in 2020, Chapters 23 and 24 became theheart of negotiations, reflecting the central role of the rule of law. The Fundamentals cluster, which includes these chapters, is opened first and remains open throughout the process. Judicial reform in Montenegro is assessed against the EU acquis and standards of independence, accountability, efficiency, professionalism, access to justice, and quality. Progress requires full implementation of reforms, stronger institutional capacity, and credible guarantees of independence and accountability, in line also with Venice Commission recommendations. In this context, the 2024 IBAR was an important political signal, but not proof of deep structural change. It reflected technical compliance and encouragement more than lasting improvements in independence, efficiency, and accountability. Despite the formal framework, structural weaknesses persist. Institutional deadlocks have repeatedly disrupted the system, most notably during the Constitutional Court crisis, when the Court became non-functional due to a lack of quorum caused by retirements and delayed parliamentary appointments. This led to partial paralysis of constitutional review, including electoral disputes, and exposed the vulnerability of key institutions to political stalemate. Judicial appointments still require broad parliamentary majorities, often resulting in prolonged vacancies, politicised bargaining, and delays in the functioning of courts and prosecution services. Courts also face backlogs, limited human resources, and uneven workload distribution, further reducing efficiency and public trust. The prosecution service faces similar challenges. Addressing these constraints requires a calibrated approach. While comprehensive vetting has been discussed, it carries too high risks of politicisation and inefficiency. Priority should instead be given to strengthening existing accountability mechanisms, particularly disciplinary and criminal procedures, along with targeted pre-appointment integrity checks for sensitive judicial positions. Judicial performance is further limited by material and infrastructural deficiencies- insufficient financial, spatial, and technical resources. This calls for a more coherent framework on the status and remuneration of judicial officeholders, aligned with independence standards, alongside stable funding and investment in infrastructure and digital capacity. Challenges also persist in ethical and disciplinary accountability. Overlap between ethical breaches and disciplinary offences can lead to inconsistent application and weaken legal certainty. This requires clearer legal distinctions, more precise definitions of misconduct, proportionate sanctions, and stronger oversight bodies. Judicial transparency continues to be applied unevenly in practice. Despite formal commitments, access to information and decisions is not consistently ensured. Improvements should focus on standardised publication practices, better public access, and stronger communication capacities within the judiciary, including staff and leadership training. These systemic issues are also reflected in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. Between 2009 and 2025, the Court delivered 82 judgments concerning Montenegro, finding at least one violation in 78 cases (95%). Most violations relate to the right to a fair trial, especially excessive length of proceedings and non­enforcement of judgments, as well as property rights. While not leading in absolute numbers, Montenegro ranks among the highest per capita, highlighting the structural nature of the problem. Civil society warns that without consistent implementation, stronger accountability, and institutional learning, Strasbourg will remain the main corrective mechanism. Montenegro as a Frontrunner Without a Functioning Rule of Law 2