Finally, the 2024–2027 Judicial Reform Strategy, intended to meet Chapter 23 benchmarks, remains limited in scope, with insufficient analytical depth, weak measurability, and unclear institutional responsibility, reinforcing the gap between formal reforms and real outcomes. Governance Gaps and Weak Accountability Reforms of key judicial governance bodies(Judicial Council and Prosecutorial Council) remain largely incomplete and have yet to deliver tangible structural change. Recent changes to its composition have raised concerns, as they risk weakening institutional continuity and reducing the role of experienced judicial professionals. Financial independence of the judiciary remains weak and continues to undermine institutional resilience. Judicial salaries are not aligned with the responsibility of office, while budgetary allocations remain insufficient, unpredictable, and slow to respond to operational needs. This affects the attractiveness of judicial careers, stability, and resistance to undue influence. Judicial efficiency is a chronic issue. Courts operate under persistent caseload imbalances, with incoming cases exceeding resolved ones, leading to backlogs. Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, intended to reduce court workload, remain underdeveloped and largely ineffective in practice. These problems are worsened by weak institutional coordination and inadequate case management practices. Cooperation between courts, prosecution, and law enforcement is fragmented, and case allocation systems are not sufficiently optimised. The lack of systematic case complexity assessment in line with European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice(CEPEJ) standards further limits effective workload management in a rational and transparent manner. Concerns about the impartiality and consistency of prosecutorial practice persist, undermining public trust. The absence of clear criteria for case prioritisation, along with limited transparency in decision-making, fuels perceptions of selective justice. As an example, the lack of response to findings of the State Audit Institution(SAI) further illustrates weak accountability, as audit findings, even in extreme cases, are not translated into corrective action by the prosecution service. This is aggravated by insufficient safeguards against external, including political, influence. Accountability mechanisms, though formally expanded, remain largely ineffective. Their application is inconsistent, and results are rarely measurable or followed up. The use of pre-trial detention remains excessive and misaligned with international standards, where it should be a measure of last resort. The 2025 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment(CPT) Preliminary Observations highlight prison overcrowding and a sharp rise in detainees, now 56% of the prison population and doubled since 2022. The Committee also notes overuse of detention and underuse of alternatives, placing pressure on an already strained system. This is also leading to severe violation of human rights, as in practice, detention is increasingly the rule rather than the exception. This underscores the need to shift towards non-custodial measures, strengthen rehabilitation and reintegration capacities, and ensure full implementation of CPT recommendations under Chapter 23 and avoiding any extension of the maximum detention period from three to five years, as it was request from some of the ruling parties. Anti-Corruption System Under Political and Operational Constraints Anti-corruption institutions are formally established, but enforcement remains limited, particularly in high-level corruption cases. The Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) continues to face serious concerns regarding its independence, enforcement capacity, and its focus on administrative compliance rather than substantive accountability and deterrence. For more than a year and a half, the Agency operated without a director holding a full mandate. The previous director was dismissed and is subject to judicial proceedings, while the acting director repeatedly failed to gain majority support in the governing Council and was perceived as close to one ruling party. Although the appointment of a fully mandated director was an EU accession benchmark for Montenegro and has now been completed, it remains to be seen to what extent the new person will be independent in practice. Additional concerns relate to governance integrity, including allegations of conflict of interest involving a Council member, which further undermines public confidence. These weaknesses are reflected also in low levels of trust and limited cooperation among public officials. A significant number of senior officials have not granted APC access to their bank accounts, including all top-level judicial office holders. Similarly, only around 30% of municipal presidents(8/25), about 40% of ministers (13/32), and roughly one third of MPs(27/81) have authorised such access, significantly limiting effective oversight and transparency. In addition, APC has not established itself as a credible actor in whistleblower protection. Concerns about inadequate handling of corruption reports within public administration further discourage reporting and weaken protection mechanisms. Finally, the acting leadership has appeared more focused on investigating former office holders than addressing risks Montenegro as a Frontrunner Without a Functioning Rule of Law 3