III. Political changes to the public service broadcasting bodies One of the most significant challenges confronting the Pol­ish public broadcaster is its profound politicization and structural dependence on the ruling political formation. This condition arises not only from inadequately formulat ­ed legal provisions, but also from successive reforms that have gradually eroded statutory safeguards of independ ­ence. The weakening of the broadcaster cannot, however, be attributed to isolated incidents; rather, it represents the outcome of a long-term process of institutional decline. Analyzing the trajectory of this deterioration demonstrates that restoring the autonomy of public service media cannot be accomplished through a single legislative intervention. Instead, it necessitates a comprehensive set of systemic re ­forms aimed at restructuring the interdependent network of institutions and regulatory mechanisms responsible for the governance of the broadcaster. 1. Weakening the role of the National Broadcasting Council The constitutional body safeguarding freedom of speech, the right to information and the public interest in radio and television broadcasting is the National Broadcasting Coun ­cil(KRRiT). Its members are appointed as follows: two members are appointed by the Sejm of the Republic of Po ­land, one member is appointed by the Senate of the Re ­public of Poland, and two members are appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland. Their terms are six years. This composition is intended to reduce the possibili ­ty of concentration of power of one political option, howev ­er achieving a politicized composition is quite simple in the case of a government with the support of the president, as was the case during the PiS-led coalition rule. It is worth noting, however, that after 2015, the constitutional position of this body was significantly weakened and some of its most important competences were transferred to the Na ­tional Media Council. In 2015, the PiS-led government pushed through a law stripping the KRRiT of its influence over the composition of the management and supervisory boards of public media companies(TVP and Polish Radio), as well as over the content of these companies’ statutes and transferring this competence to the Minister of the State Treasury. The scope of discretion in exercising the powers granted to the KRRiT by the Constitution was therefore significantly limited, and the institution was de ­prived of its crucial functions, resulting in the lack of ability to fulfill its constitutional mission. This was confirmed by the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 13 December 2016, which stated that depriving the KRRiT—a body estab ­lished under the Constitution of the Republic of Poland—of its role in appointing and dismissing the governing bodies of public radio and television companies was unconstitu ­tional 27 . Although the Constitutional Tribunal ordered the restoration of the constitutional order, the judgment was not implemented. In June 2016, the PiS-led government passed a new law on the National Media Council 28 , deem ­ing the law challenged by the Tribunal lost its binding force in this case. 2. National Media Council as a new decisive power The Act on the National Media Council, established a new body—the National Media Council—and granted it authori ­ty over the appointment and dismissal of members of pub ­lic radio and television bodies and the Polish Press Agency. Theoretically, the Council assumed these powers from the minister responsible for the State Treasury, but in reality, these are the original powers of the National Broadcasting Council(KRRiT). The composition of the new body intro ­duced into the public media system has been questionable from the outset 29 , as its composition is directly dependent on the parliamentary majority. The Council consists of five members, three of whom are elected by the Sejm and two members are appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland, on the basis of candidates nominated by the oppo ­sition camps, provided, however, that if all opposition clubs refrain from nominating their representatives to the new body, the president may appoint the members inde ­pendently. Moreover, unlike the composition of the KRRiT, a member of the National Media Council may be a politi ­cian and simultaneously hold a parliamentary or senatorial mandate. The National Media Council quickly became a supportive body for the government, appointing new boards of public media companies, which quickly redirect ­ed the public broadcaster’s activities toward biased and propaganda-driven messages. The Commissioner for Hu ­man Rights 30 has repeatedly intervened in the matter of public media, emphasizing that public media in Poland fail to maintain the pluralism, impartiality, balance, and inde ­pendence of coverage that they were supposed to guaran ­tee by law. He also cited independent analyses from vari ­ous research centers, including the Polish Language Coun ­cil, which in one report indicated that“TVP News does not convey objective information to citizens, but its own vision of the events discussed.[...] The linguistic and communica ­tion practices in the News tickers are often manipulative – the broadcaster’s persuasive influence on the audience is hidden and pursues the broadcaster’s particular goals, without considering the broadly understood and inclusive 27  See: Wyrok Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 13 grudnia 2016 r. sygn. akt K 13/16, Dz.U. 2016 poz. 2210, Sejm RP. 28  Ustawa z dnia 22 czerwca 2016 r. o Radzie Mediów Narodowych… 29  See: L. Jaskuła, Problemy w wykonywaniu zadań przez Krajową Radę Radiofonii i Telewizji w kontekście utworzenia Rady Mediów Narodowych, Studia Prawnoustrojowe 58/2022. 30 Sytuacja w mediach publicznych. Ponowna odpowiedź MKiDN, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich 2024, https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-media-publiczne-sytuacja-potrze ­bna-nowelizacja-mkidn-ponowne-odpowiedz[Accessed: 13.09.2025]. State of public service broadcasting in Poland 8