The Caspian Sea Littoral States: The Object of a New“Great Game?” William Odom The most I can do in addressing the Great Game and Regional Security is to offer some elementary ideas about how to view them. My remarks, therefore, are intended as a modest contribution to clarification of the topic, and particularly, of why the United States is ill positioned to deal with the regional security problems of the Caucasus and Central Asia. I. Why the Great Game Image is Misleading It has become popular to see a new Great Game shaping up in this region, one in the tradition of what Rudyard Kipling called the Great Game between Russia and Great Britain over this same region during the nineteenth century. This image is misleading because it obscures at least four major differences. First, the nineteenth century Great Game was between two imperial powers, Russia and Britain. Today, Russia is up against many players. Nearby outside regional players include, at a minimum, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and China. Western Europe and the United States are not yet players although their big oil companies are dragging them into the game. Finally, inside the region several Newly Independent States are players; three in the Caucasus and at least three of the Central Asian countries, perhaps all five. Second, the old Great Game was one of competing imperialism. Today, imperialism is found only on the Russian side, and there it is a seriously weakened and could either disappear entirely or revive in a limited way. The jury is still out over which course Russia will follow. Third, the character of the regimes within the contested areas is quite different from the nineteenth century. These former Soviet republics have high literacy rates, experience with industrialization and urbanization, and an active intelligentsia. The intelligentsias are attempting to articulate indigenous identities – religious, cultural, and ethnic – 77