of borders is characterised by the deployment of both state and non-state(para)military personnel and/or equipment for border security, as evidenced in the arming of foreign and local security actors, exchange of information, and mixing of anti-terror and anti-smuggling initiatives to prevent migration into the EU. 15 Populist radical right parties in European politics – fuelled by the'migration crisis' in 2015 and dating back to the 2008 economic crisis – have also seen the EU Parliament favour externalisation policies. 16 EU border states like Italy have further entered into bilateral agreements with African states like Libya because of uneven responsibility sharing between the Schengen states and with the backdrop of the Dublin Regulation. 17 The political, economic and social transformations caused by externalisation policies within African states(particularly border countries) have been ignored, despite studies and reports indicating that they have perpetuated immobility amongst historically mobile African groups and resulted in the loss of livelihoods, 18 introduced new forms of displacement, 19 created a surge in the smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons, and led to unprecedented human rights abuses. 20 This policy brief focuses on these four relatively ignored facets from an African standpoint, with the aim of exposing the shortcomings of current externalisation narratives, which have long been defined predominantly using a European lens. 2. Externalisation as a disruptor of free movement within Africa Free movement has been the backbone of cooperation within Africa's different RECs. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community have particularly robust free-movement protocols that have eased movement within these regions. However, the EU and its member states' externalisation agreements, such as with Niger(regarding the city of Agadez), have been found to greatly contradict ECOWAS' free­movement protocols by hampering regular migration not only in Niger but throughout the greater Sahel region. 21 In 2015, the Nigerien government passed Law 2015-36 under considerable pressure from the EU. The law, as applied since 2016, criminalises migration movements starting from the north of Agadez and does not differentiate between the country's varied historical forms of migration. 22 Some migrants, despite having documents necessary for regular border crossing, have opted to use clandestine means of transportation because of disinformation and lack of adequate information concerning the law. Law enforcement agencies, too, have capitalised on the strictness of the law to extort huge bribes from regular traders and migrants using the major travelling routes, consequently resulting in some preferring covert, non-monitored roads with the aid of smugglers. 23 To put this in context, Agadez has been a historical transit zone for the wider Sahel region, extending from Senegal to Sudan and the Sahara Desert. Movements in the region have been seasonal, depending on weather patterns. Reports and longitudinal studies indicate that 80% of migrants travelling through and out of Niger do not intend to make their way to Europe, as migration is essential to local economies, since many people's livelihoods depend on this free movement. 24 An estimated 84% of the West African migrant population does, in fact, move within the ECOWAS for livelihood purposes. 25 Despite undergoing reform, the law has curtailed the free movement of persons in the region in various forms, regardless of whether they are regular or irregular, standing in direct contradiction to the ECOWAS' protocol on free movement and people's historical way of living in the region. ECOWAS has unfortunately been unable to fully assume its role as guarantor of this right for the nationals of its area due to the EU and its member states' interference. In recent developments, Cote d'Ivore and Tunisia have started procedures to restore entry visas for Ivorians, following their mass repatriation from Tunisia due to externalisation and xenophobic rhetoric in Tunisia. 26 A no-win situation: Deconstructing the efficacy of EU externalisation policies from an African perspective 5