EU-driven restrictive policies have further interrupted historical circular migration patterns within the African continent and prolonged migration periods in destination and transit countries. Irregular migrants are less willing or likely to return home voluntarily if they feel they cannot do so safely and easily and could lose their ability to return. 27 Feelings of embarrassment because of the failed migration project and the perception of bringing shame on the family upon return also contribute to delayed returns. Restrictive policies and legislative frameworks in Africa pushed by the EU have, therefore, encouraged more permanent migration that includes more family members. 28 It can be said that the EU, rather than solving the so-called'migration crisis', has simply moved it abroad, as thousands of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are currently stranded in Niger, Libya and Tunisia in deplorable conditions. The number of refugees within ECOWAS countries has, in fact, increased over the years. 29 Tensions between local communities – forced to share already limited resources with migrants and refugees – have also increased in African countries that have entered into externalisation agreements with the EU. 30 3. New forms of displacement and new migration routes While EU externalisation initiatives in Niger, as with other frontier countries like Libya and Tunisia, have led to a reduction in the number of registered migrants travelling within the West, Sahel and North of Africa, it has increased the level of irregular migration, migrants' vulner­a­bility, overall corruption and state instability in these countries. 31 It has been alluded to that discontent with EU-promoted migration control policies partly contributed to the unpopularity of the toppled Nigerien president, Mohamed Bazoum, who was ousted in a military coup in July 2023. 32 Although the coup cannot be directly attributed to this, the excessive emphasis on securitisation and militarisation in the region, as part of counterterrorism and migration-control Increased securitisation and militarisation, especially along the popular migration corridors in Africa, have also increased the overall cost of migration. efforts solicited by the EU – rather than state­building efforts and ensuring the economic welfare of the communities – is a contributing factor. 33 In Libya, EU externalisation projects have led to a vicious cycle, where the influx of arms and funds to state and non-state actors(private security firms) willing to enact the European containment agenda has granted these actors political legitimisation that has been used to undermine migrant rights(interception from sea, forcible return, torture, unlawful killings, sexual violence and forced labour). 34 The Libyan government and militia have further limited access to humanitarian actors, and many organisations have had problems in getting visas (including the UN). 35 The political legitimisation through EU collaboration has further given the Libyan government capabilities to repress domestic opposition and dissent, consequently destabilising internal democratisation processes. 36 The short-term European goal of preventing migrant flows through externalisation thereby risks compromising the stated long-term goal of tackling the causes of displacement within the continent. The efficacy of the recent EU deal 37 with the Tunisian regime also continues to spark intense debate, despite the deal being on the brink of collapse. 38 Civil rights defenders in Tunisia point out that the violent crackdown on sub-Saharan migrants following the deal has resulted in a record surge of clandestine boats to Italy. 39 In July 2023, during the height of the crackdown, nearly 14,000 migrants, the vast majority sub-Saharan, reached Italy via Tunisia, a record for this Mediterranean route, 40 but nothing near the hundreds of thousands of migrants in transit countries, as earlier illustrated. A no-win situation: Deconstructing the efficacy of 6 EU externalisation policies from an African perspective