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Evaluation of four decades of pension privatization in Latin America, 1980-2000 : promises and reality
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The Dominican Republic The Dominican Republic has an incipient aging, the second youngest private system, the second lowest coverage of the older-adult population(because it has not implemented the mandate of the structural reform to establish the non-contributory pension) and it never issued the recognition bond. On the other hand, the retirement age of men is the lowest among the nine countries, there are numerous separate regimes that are unbalanced, there is a debt for evasion and payment delay equivalent to 82% of the pension fund in individual accounts, and the lowest contribution and the lowest gross real capital return of the nine countries. A parametric reform in 2020 implemented insufficient measures focused on reducing administrative fees, but it did not approve the increase in age and waived the debt surcharges. B. EVALUATION OF THE RE-REFORMS IN ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, CHILE, AND EL SALVADOR The re-reforms in Argentina(2008) 105 and Bolivia(2010) 106 closed the private pillar/system and transferred all the insured and funds to the public PAYG system, while the re-reforms in Chile(2008) and El Salvador(2017) main­tained the private system; the Chilean re-reform improved coverage, social solidarity, gender equity, and financial sustainability, while the Salvadoran re-reform focused on reducing the fiscal deficit. The first three re-reforms improved several failures of the structural reforms, but not the Salvadoran one. Here is a summary of the evaluation results: 105 The discussion on the Argentine re-reform in FIAP(2020b) covers less than four pages, while the ILO chapter on such subject(Bertranou et al., 2018) covers 23 pages and its conclusion on the risk of the systems unsustainability is similar; FIAP ignores that chapter. 106 FIAP(2020b) explains, in only half a page, what it does not consider a re-reform in Bolivia, while my chapter in the ILO book(Mesa-Lago, 2018a) covers 42 pages on the subject, where I prove that it is a re-reform. I also analyze the changes in coverage, social solidarity, gender equity, and administration; I document the risk of financial insolvency in much greater detail than FIAP does; FIAP also ignores said chapter. 193