FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG GLOBAL EUROPE AND GREAT POWER COMPETITION Defence Strategy also mentions Russian»aggression« and its various»violations of the rules of international law«, contributing »to the deterioration of regional stability«, ⁵ which in turn prompted Russia's Foreign Ministry to accuse Bucharest of subservience, plagiarism and betrayal of its own interests ⁶. Moreover, the crisis which has recently flared up in the South Caucasus region over Nagorno-Karabakh gives additional cause for concern for Europe. To the South, the Eastern Mediterranean, with its extension through the East Africa-Red Sea corridor, is becoming an ever more perilous region, as geopolitical fault lines continue to become entangled. The frozen conflict in Cyprus, the scramble for prized gas fields, as well as the increasingly complicated wars in Libya and Syria threaten the stability of the region. In the face of these risk-fraught conditions, which are very real and close to its Eastern and Southern borders, Eastern Europe will most likely stick to its conviction that when it comes to strategic sovereignty it is hard security and defence aspects, such as the ones mentioned above, that truly matter. This perception shapes in a decisive manner how Eastern Europe views European autonomy/sovereignty: first and foremost, a strong bond to collective deterrence through NATO coupled with strategic engagement with the United States, as the only real alternative in terms of ensuring security for the region. Eastern Europeans consider this to be of paramount importance, and yet many decision-makers in Western Europe still react with bewilderment to developments involving NATO or initiated by the US that have been embraced by Eastern European countries in recent years and months: the relocation of US troops to Poland and Romania, the ramping up of military and non­military cooperation across the region, or the launch of mammoth energy and infrastructure projects with the blessing of the US in formats such as the Three Seas Initiative(3SI). Different understandings of»hard« security needs, deriving from Eastern Europe's direct exposure to Russian threats, can contribute to divergences in terms of what European policies the EU Member States feel compelled to support or adopt. For example, although at the EU level attempts are being made to move forward in the area of energy integration, states continue to treat energy security issues as a national domain, with current projects such as Nord Stream II only accentuating differing perceptions. Whereas Germany has a market-oriented mindset and considers the project's significance to be logical from an economic perspective, States such as Poland, which view the geopolitical and strategic equation vis-à-vis Russia with foreboding and apprehension, believe that the pipeline decreases(energy) security. It is evident from this issue alone that there are pointedly different views on what strategic sovereignty ultimately means. This lack of a common understanding could prove to be a hindrance for other integration initiatives at the EU level. 2.2 EUROPEAN STANDARDS AT HOME FIRST The second objective of Europe's strategic autonomy, as explained by the President of the European Council, rests on the ability to disseminate European standards. He touches on standards relating to the safety of food and other products, the General Data Protection Regulation(GDPR) and online privacy, putting an end to hate speech, and setting climate and environmental standards. This may be easier said than done, since, from an Eastern European perspective, the notion of »European standards« should be extended to include the achievement of internal standards in addition to those set by the European Union in relation to external partners. The standards that the world perceives when it thinks of Europe, and the standards usually taken as benchmarks, have been set by Western Europe. These are the ones that the EU seeks to propagate around the world. From the Eastern European perspective, however, it can be seen that Europe is talking about standards that it has yet to fully implement throughout its entire territory. This has a negative impact on how the EU's international efforts are perceived by East Europeans, as their reading of the situation is that Europe is being disingenuous by not first making every effort to bring about an internal convergence in standards before it reaches out to the world to promote them. In other words, the East sees the legitimacy upon which the EU could build its international clout to be what it does in its own front yard – an approach which would then also have the full buy-in and support of Eastern Europe. This is not to deny that Eastern and Central Europe have witnessed dramatic economic growth over the last thirty years in comparison to other regions of the globe. Nor does it mean that the EU should lower its standards. However, there is at least one issue that must be addressed in earnest should Europe want to define sovereignty with inclusivity at its core: social and economic cohesion, with regard to which divergences persist between Eastern and Western Europe. When it comes to economic competitiveness and purchasing power, it should not come as a surprise that Eastern Europe feels less»sovereign« and generally less able to cope with perceived dependencies, such as a massive»brain drain« and unsustainable imbalances characterising local labour markets, which coupled with poor access to financial resources, a persistent dearth of know-how and a failure to sufficiently modernise infrastructures act as a brake on the economy, hampering any real efforts at intra-European convergence. Instead of seeing these exclusively as painful weaknesses afflicting the new Member States, they should instead be viewed as asymmetries and shortcomings of the Internal Market that warrant more attention. Truth be told: the difference between being sophisticated, economically 4