FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG GLOBAL EUROPE AND GREAT POWER COMPETITION 6 TOWARDS A MORE COHERENT RESPONSE IN FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS None of this will be possible to achieve if the EU fails to put internal mechanisms in place that enable it to take decisions and act fast. The current architecture of the EU treaties clearly establishes specific voting procedures for aspects of foreign or defence policy requiring unanimity. And it is this required unanimity that has been highlighted as one of the obstacles in the path toward an efficient and collective response by the EU. Due to the requirement that voting be unanimous, any State can effectively block decisions in order to advance or protect national interests. The European Union's situation stands in stark contrast to that of NATO. The same Member States make up a majority in the two organisations, but such blockages are not known to have happened in NATO. It may be worthwhile considering the possibility that either the EU has designed its systems inadequately to deal with the inevitable dissensions that appear during negotiation processes, or that operationally NATO has learned how to deal with these aspects better. Yet there may also be another explanation: NATO may prioritise its members' defence interests in a more mutually respectful and inclusive manner than the EU, for which the institutional agenda enjoys a higher priority than other interests, or where the institutional and economic capacity of the various Member States may play a role in the way specific points and positions are forwarded for adoption by the EU's diplomatic apparatus. The aspect of a»level playing field« then becomes a painfully evident potential issue that prevents the EU from achieving internal coherence and agility in its CFSP. After all, the EU places a greater emphasis on small but essential institutional and economic matters, which makes decision-making so much more difficult than in NATO. These asymmetries in positions and the requirement of unanimity have proven to be deal-breakers in virtually all attempts to develop a common EU foreign policy ²⁰. Another argument weighing against the requirement of unanimity is that it makes the bloc more vulnerable to foreign power meddling in its affairs. Countries such as Russia can influence things from within, as they only need to convince one Member State to oppose a resolution for it to be turned down. This heightens the incentive to employ divide et impera tactics if only because it can lead to the desired outcomes. Thus, it could be argued that the unanimity requirement, while initially meant to drive unity, now holds the potential to aggravate existing divisions within the EU. Under Jean-Claude Juncker's leadership, the Commission officially proposed to change the unanimity requirement to Qualified Majority Voting(QMV) in specific CFSP areas. The current Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, has voiced her support for such a change ²¹. The most important advantage that such a voting system would mean is the speed and efficiency it would add to EU decision­making processes, thus helping the EU to become a stronger and more assertive actor in a perilous international and regional environment. If it takes only one country to block a resolution, then there is no need for that country to offer any lengthy justification for its stance aside from this merely being in its own interest. With a majority voting system, the task would be to win over a majority of other Member States for one's position. Some observers argue that this voting system would actually unite States more. Due to the increased need for discussion and formation of coalitions, countries which are outvoted could still present their views and pertinent arguments, and there would be less»shaming« of single countries blocking collective interests for narrow, parochial reasons. However, there are also negative aspects to be considered – some of which are particularly important for the Eastern Member States. Smaller States fear being marginalised and their voices left unheard if bigger and more influential countries can take decisions by themselves. Moreover, the introduction of QMV could raise questions of legitimacy and impact the EU's image as a united body of countries. If a minority of countries are consistently outvoted, this could have a tremendous impact on how the EU is viewed by external parties and partners. But even worse, it could impact how Member States' governments and societies regard the Union. In the worst-case scenario, this could lead to a dangerous increase in EU-scepticism among voters and domestic political backlash. 12