DEALING WITH STRATEGIC ALLIES AND COMPETITORS IN TIMES OF A ZEITGEIST MARKED BY GREAT POWER COMPETITION the EU may appear to be straddling the rift between the US and China at times(and Global Europe is seen to be in great power competition with Washington and Beijng), it is also struggling with internal divisions when it comes to potential opportunities deriving from the complex web of strategic partnerships that the EU has been upholding. When approaching competition between the US and China on major dossiers, the EU is simultaneously dealing with its own vulnerabilities, overwhelmingly deriving from the fragile consensus on what the bloc's strategic priorities and single voice should be. The past few years have shown that there is no split between Europe's East and Europe's West when it comes to dealing with the United States, respectively China; reductionist takes are based on the opinion that Central and Eastern Europe, with its »less performing« economies, tends to be more vulnerable to politically-charged investments from China, whereas Europe's West is more capable of upholding and preserving rules, regulations and political integrity. However, developments such as the West's lack of consensus on how to approach Chinese 5G technologies and Italy's infatuation with Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative, added to the fact that most Chinese FDI is directed at Western and Northern Europe¹, refute the assertion that China's primary focus is on Eastern Europe. Although one may recall instances when Eastern European capitals have struck what has been perceived as a wrong note in Brussels, as a result of Chinese links, these may not be enough to paint a realistic and comprehensive picture of the Eastern EU's behaviour in a setting of great power competition. In Eastern Europe, security links with the US are stronger than prosperity-based ties with China, and Washington is keen to nudge partners to make a clear commitment to it. To highlight the diversity of approaches to international affairs, one must also look at the significance of strategic partnerships with the US, especially for Central and Eastern Europe, which tends to favour partnerships based on shared security objectives in a challenging regional context. Whereas there is no match for the EU's economic contribution to Central and Eastern Europe, strategic partnerships with the US and membership in NATO are the most reliable security guarantees when it comes to containing Russian assertiveness in the region, including towards the Eastern Partnership. Thus, to accommodate CEE expectations, the German EU Presidency needs to demonstrate a deeper understanding of the region's particular special interests and challenges when engaging in future negotiations. This is a challenge also shared with the»Geopolitical Commission« headed by von der Leyen:»strategic autonomy« in the East means more national flexibility to do something; it is not about decoupling from the US. The German EU Presidency should achieve significant progress in improving market access and arrangements with China to protect investments. In particular, the EU-China investment agreement, which is long overdue, was expected to be 1 concluded in 2020 and eventually deliver on the goal of ensuring a level playing field for European companies in the Chinese market, although the negotiations that started in 2013 have proven to be tedious. This investment agreement would replace over 25 bilateral investment-promotion and protection agreements between China and EU Member States, while establishing a much-needed single European voice as a precedent for further negotiations. However, conditions surrounding post-crisis economic recovery are taking a toll on economic and trade coordination at EU level and may fuel an ascendancy of economic patriotism, while lowering the appetite for international cooperation that imply high dependence on supply value chains under the control of other great powers. It is still difficult to predict what the impact of these trends will be on deals made by the EU and its regulatory power, although the EU leadership, above all the European Commission, is acknowledging the key importance of consolidating current partnerships. To this end, as of 26 May, leaders of the EU and Japan have agreed to avoid»unnecessary travel and export restrictions« to counter the COVID-19 pandemic and defend multilateralism. The EU and Japan concluded the biggest free trade agreement in the world in 2017, with this being followed by intensive talks on EU-Asia connectivity, thereby setting standards for further talks. Yet extensive EU-Asia connectivity cannot exclude China or China's approach to connectivity(as seen in Central and Eastern Europe or the Western Balkans), which produces an opportunity for the German EU Presidency to address, first and foremost, the issue of standards and regulations for sustainable connectivity, thus reaffirming the EU's global leadership on this matter. Recent media reports have suggested that the German EU Presidency may also seek a resumption of negotiations on the Mercosur Agreement and trade policy with the United States, particularly with the aim of avoiding a transatlantic trade war. In addition, the Trio Presidency Program may also include trade negotiations with Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand and India. In a period of intensifying great power competition, the EU may well be better off, instead of letting itself be forced to choose sides, to opt instead for a widening web of alliances and consolidation of global exchanges. This strategy, however, may be conditional, among other things, on the EU's flexibility and openness to a reform of key multilateral organisations, such as the World Trade Organization and, ever more topical, the World Health Organization. With a push for reform being part of Washington's narrative, this creates an opportunity for Berlin(and Brussels) to avoid being dragged into the American–Chinese bickering and its spill-over effect on international organisations. Last year, Germany and France launched the Alliance for Multilateralism, an informal initiative that has the potential to develop a more appealing vision on how to restructure the global order(starting with a properly functioning WTO and WHO), while ensuring preservation of a rules-based, liberal, and inclusive system. Much remains to be done here in bringing together mid-size and regional powers while creating a bedrock for reform, as opposed to collapse, of strategic and sectoral international cooperation. As regards such evolutionary developments along the lines of a Global Europe 7