Introduction “The sides will seek to create a positive atmosphere to ensure the talks succeed(…). They also commit to efforts to implement confidence building measures that will provide a dynamic impetus to the prospect for a united Cyprus.” The above is part of the joint declaration between the two community leaders(dated 11 February 2014), set out as a basis for the most recent round of negotiations to reach a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus dispute. Although the two Cypriot leaders repeated their commitment to a“comprehensive solution”, no dynamic impetus has been cultivated, partly because they“put the cart before the horse”; in other words, they insisted on achieving a“comprehensive solution” in order to take steps for peace. This report is an attempt to understand the methodological problems of the peace process. It is based on six premises: 1) We are not close to a solution: Although the two sides have always emphasized their commitment to a comprehensive solution, there are important difficulties towards achieving such a solution in Cyprus in the near future. 2) The“comprehensive settlement” catchphrase feeds political inactivity: It seems that the notion of a“comprehensive settlement” has ended up as an“all or nothing” ideology that justifies political inactivity, preventing positive steps towards a solution. 3) Mutual distrust is still prevalent: There are strong fears among the Greek Cypriot political elite that the Turkish Cypriot side has a secessionist tendency, aimed at dividing the common homeland. There are strong fears among the Turkish Cypriot political elite that the Greek Cypriot side has a hegemonic tendency, aimed at controlling the common state through marginalizing Turkish Cypriots. 4) We need social capital: We need to foster a tradition of collaboration among the communities of Cyprus before meaningful progress can be made towards solving common problems and, thereafter, sustaining an agreed solution. 5) The status quo is alive on both sides: The two communities have become resigned to the status quo, in the absence of incentives to break the stalemate. 6) There is no painless unilateral exit from the peace process: If the Turkish Cypriot side tries to exit the process unilaterally, it may experience further negative effects related to the current status quo. If the Greek Cypriot side tries to exit the process unilaterally, this may result in the permanent partition of the island. 5