II. Can the“piecemeal” model be successfully implemented in Cyprus? By Nicos Peristianis and Yücel Vural Since the territorial division of Cyprus in 1974, there have been a number of goodwill gestures which constitute examples of the piecemeal model for moving towards peace/ resolving the conflict on the island. A goodwill gesture is a short- or long-term(provisional or permanent) measure whose initiation and implementation is easier and simpler than a comprehensive resolution of a complex problem. A goodwill gesture may be associated with a comprehensive solution to a problem, or it may aim at resolving a particular issue(s) unconnected to the larger problem in a direct way(e.g. practical or humanitarian considerations), but which may have positive spillover effects, aiding the resolution of the problem in indirect ways – such as through increasing trust between the warring sides, and, hence, creating a more conducive milieu for conflict resolution negotiations. 1. Classification of goodwill measures Goodwill gestures may be classified on the basis of a number of features, such as: the actors involved in the initiation of the measure; the intended reasons or the expected outcomes of the initiative; the type of goodwill measure introduced; the degree of acceptance/legitimacy of a measure by the parties involved; and the overall outcome, which may emerge independently of the intended reasons for the initiative. Considering the actors that undertake responsibility for a particular initiative, goodwill gestures could be classified into three sub-categories on the basis of whether the initiative was undertaken jointly or unilaterally, and in relation to the expectations of the actors involved(see Appendix I). The first sub-category includes unilateral initiatives by one of the parties without the expectation of reciprocal moves by the other party. In this case, the initiation and the successful implementation of goodwill measures do not necessarily require the explicit support of, and/or reciprocation by, the other side. This is often the case when the expectations of the two sides vary significantly, since they rest on conflicting perspectives or definitions of the situation. Thus, while the initiator tends to emphasize the necessity of a measure and/or the expected positive results, the receiving party may be suspicious of the intended objectives and/or may doubt the positivity of the expected results. It follows that such initiatives by one of the sides may be considered dangerous or politically risky by the other side – hence, the latter would tend to be indifferent both to the initiation and the implementation of the measure. Similarly, the legitimacy bestowed to the measure on the side which initiated it may be high, but much lower on the opposite side. The second sub-category includes unilateral initiatives by one of the parties, positively received by the other party. In this case, the intended aim/objective of 15