happened due to the nature of the political environment and the actual lack of political stability. Since the issue of VE flared up publically and institutionally during 2014, the new government in place, a coalition government, was faced with the fact that it was a weak coalition and it had a huge opposition, resulting in constant political unrest. This resulted in too many distractions and a loss of focus by the government, which then led to an initially less than harmonized national strategy on how to counter radicalization and violent extremism. A lack of a well harmonized and well-coordinated drafting and implementation of the strategy from the get go, would have enabled PVE carrier institutions to be better informed and prepared to carry out PVE activities, but this unfortunately did not happen. So far, the approach taken has been much more focused on the CVE activities and there has been a lack of understanding on the complexity of the underlying causes not just of radicalization but especially the cross over to violent extremism. In this sense, a national level policy on CVE that fails to consider the implications that lack of human security and societal security may have on CVE/PVE e orts is nothing short of shortsighted(Coleman, Human security in Kosovo: The other side of National Security?, 2016). The three above mentioned examples show a high relevance to Kosovo's human security and therefore, its national security. Yet important challenges to human security have often received insu cient attention, as the focus of the Kosovo government, and that of the international community has been mainly targeting top down issues with security, from a more traditional and Realist perspective. Failing to address basic needs related to the human security and societal security of Kosovo citizens a ects their capabilities to constitutionally given fundamental rights, their ability to be active citizens and to participate in creating the change they need as well as contributes to further perpetuate their already flared up identity crises. This in turn makes for vulnerable citizens, and a vulnerable state, citizens unable to live fulfilling lives and a resulting unconsolidated and weak state with a very porous national security. IV. How can the Kosovo Government do better? In order to be able to address the challenges that Kosovo is facing as a country and as a people, state institutions and therefore the government must function in a stable manner within the mandate earned, as to provide for enough time for handover from a previous government, an initial phase of understanding where the systems are being challenged in meeting the needs of the population, and then having enough time to actually deliver e cient solutions. Sadly, this has not been the case in Kosovo, since 2010, and arguably even earlier, and still continues the perpetual cycle with the recent elections and yet another limbo until a new government gets established. Therefore, it is safe to say that political instability is the potential breeding ground for an overall lack of institutional memory, continuity and progress, and therefore a breeding ground for a deteriorated state of human security and societal security which ultimately threaten the national security of Kosovo. Like human beings, states must adapt to new environments and accommodate to geostrategic changes in order to preserve themselves. This may mean that initially the security concept as a whole 12