→ The success or failure of NATO’s deterrence and de­fence posture towards Russia will be determined by the military capabilities and policies of the European part of the Alliance. While the United States may contribute positively to these efforts, especially in the short term, it will be up to NATO’s European pillar to deter Russia. Pre-summit expectations NATO’s Hague summit resulted in a historic commitment by the allies to increase defence spending to 5 per cent of GDP. Expectations leading up to the summit, however, were cautious. The aim was to give Trump a win in the form of a defence spending commitment, keep the summit as brief as possible, reduce any potential for disagreement to a minimum, and allow Trump to get his way on everything. 1 It became clear well in advance that the NATO summit in The Hague would be devoted to increasing de­fence spending, a goal in line with the Baltic states’ priori­ties. Had the allies not been ready to commit to higher de­fence spending, it was likely that Trump would not even show up. Despite the concessions made to President Trump, there was a risk that the summit would descend into mutual re­criminations between Trump and European leaders. Presi­dent Trump had repeatedly criticised European allies for not spending enough on defence and even called into question the US commitment to Article 5. Transatlantic disagreements resurfaced upon Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, with Trump imposing tar ­iffs against the EU and Vice-president JD Vance criticising European states – Germany in particular – for allegedly restricting freedom of speech. NATO’s Hague summit could have ended in bitter disagreements and sudden US disengagement from Europe. This would have been the worst-case scenario for the Baltic states, whose security depends on NATO’s capabilities and cohesion. The hope, however, was that the summit would reaffirm the endur­ing character of the Transatlantic partnership, thus strengthening NATO deterrence against Russia and giving Europe the breathing space necessary for defence invest­ments to materialise. While the main concern before the summit was Trump’s position on NATO, there were also concerns regarding the European allies’ willingness to commit to much higher de­fence spending. Eventually, a compromise was achieved between the US demand that allies spend 5 per cent of GDP on defence(US defence spending in 2024 being 3.38 per cent 2 ) and the Europeans’ apparent inability to com­mit to such high defence spending. The compromise was that allies would spend 3.5 per cent of GDP on core de ­fence requirements and an additional 1.5 per cent on non-military aspects of security, such as resilience, cyber security, infrastructure, innovation and the defence indus­try. It is important to note that the Baltic states’ defence spending already exceeds the commitments made in The Hague. The timeline for increasing defence spending became a di­visive issue, as some allies sought to extend the deadline for reaching the 5 per cent target as far into the future as possible. Eventually, the allies agreed to set 2035 as the target date, with a progress review scheduled for 2029. This is a setback for the Baltic states, as they advocated ramp­ing up defence spending by 2032. Spain, on the other hand, was uncomfortable even with postponing until 2035. Their threat perception and fiscal constraints make it unlikely that they will meet the ambitious defence spending tar­gets. This is an early indication of the difficulties the allies are to likely face. There was little indication prior to the summit that signifi­cant progress would be made on developing a common strategy on Russia and supporting Ukraine. President Trump pursued diplomacy with Russia in the spring of 2025 with two aims: ending the war in Ukraine and normalising relations with Russia. The US has tried to take an even-handed approach to Russia and Ukraine and has of­fered concessions to the former to facilitate negotiations. Meaningful progress has been elusive in talks with Russia, but the US approach had not evolved by the time of NA­TO’s Hague summit. Thus, adopting a more assertive pos­ture towards Russia was not possible. Russia, however, was referred to in the summit declaration as a»long-term threat«. 3 The immediate context of NATO’s Hague summit was pro­vided by the military confrontation between Israel and Iran and the US decision to use its unique military capabilities to target the latter’s nuclear facilities in Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow. Although the extent to which the US attack succeeded in setting back Iran’s nuclear programme is yet to be determined, President Trump claimed that the mis­sion shortly before the Hague summit was a success and that the targeted nuclear sites had been»obliterated«. 4 NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte tried to use the US bombing of nuclear sites in Iran as an opportunity to ap­peal to Trump, claiming that the US use of military force against Iran had been a success and that the NATO sum­mit in The Hague would likewise be a success for the US 1 Ed Arnold(2025): All About Trump: the 2025 NATO Hague Summit, 26 June. London, RUSI; available at: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/ commentary/all-about-trump-2025-nato-hague-summit 2 NATO(2024): Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries(2014–2024). Brussels, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2024, p. 4; available at: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_ fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617-def-exp-2024-en.pdf 3 NATO(2025): The Hague Summit Declaration. Hague, 25 June; available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_236705.htm 4  The White House(2025): Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Have Been Obliterated – and Suggestions Otherwise Are Fake News. Washington, 25 June; available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/06/irans-nuclear-facilities-have-been-obliterated-and-suggestions-otherwise-are-fake-news/ NATO summit in The Hague: the Baltic perspective 2