Third, it is too early to tell what Russia’s takeaways from the NATO Hague summit will be. Although it is hard to gauge Russia’s thinking about the credibility of NATO de­terrence, conflicting interpretations of the Hague summit are possible. The NATO allies’ pledge to increase defence spending is bad news for Moscow. Certain aspects of the summit, however, display NATO’s weaknesses. Europe’s re­liance on the US for security and defence is a sign of a lack of confidence among the European allies that they can stand up to Russia on their own. Also, the pledge to spend 5 per cent on defence and security is unlikely to be fulfilled any time soon by some allies, prompting disagreements within the Alliance. Furthermore, it remains to be seen what the outcome of the US Global Posture Review will be. 13 However, US military presence in Europe is likely to be reduced. The extent of the US withdrawal from Europe is too early to determine, however, not to mention whether the US military presence in frontline states such as Poland and the Baltics will be affected. If the US eventually with­draws large parts of its military presence in Europe, then the positive effects of NATO’s Hague summit may be out­weighed by visible signs of the United States’ lack of inter­est in Europe. Fourth, President Trump met with the Ukrainian leader Vo ­lodymir Zelensky during the NATO summit. The US Presi­dent characterised their conversation in positive terms. President Zelensky asked for additional missile interceptors for Patriot batteries. However, military aid to Ukraine was briefly suspended after the NATO summit. While low weap­ons and ammunition stockpiles were cited as the main rea­son why some weaponry was not delivered to Ukraine, 14 this raises questions about the reliability of the US defence assistance and its future availability. This decision placed Ukraine at a disadvantage at a crucial time when Russia’s aerial attacks on Ukraine intensified. 15 Also, it is unlikely that another US military assistance package to Ukraine will be adopted during President Trump’s second term. The package that was adopted during Joe Biden’s presi­dency is nearing its end, and Ukraine needs more military assistance to defend itself against Russia. Finally, the organisation of the Hague summit is inade ­quate for managing the transatlantic relationship in the long run. Allies went to great lengths to avoid discussing difficult issues, for example. This is hardly sustainable. NATO’s Hague summit made remarkable progress on de­fence spending, but it did not accomplish much else. There are other divisive issues, such as NATO’s Russia strategy and military personnel shortfalls that have to be addressed by the allies, one way or another. These issues are particu­larly important for the Baltic states because they affect NATO’s ability to deter Russia. What implications for Baltic-Nordic security? The Trump administration’s often disparaging approach to its European allies has caused considerable concern in the Baltic region. However, the current US approach may yet impact Baltic security positively. But this is possible only if the countries of northern Europe invest substantially in de­fence and security. Importantly, this is already happening. Poland and the Baltic states have increased defence spend­ing significantly and are already above 3.5 per cent of GDP. The Nordic states and Germany are also in the process of ambitious defence spending increases, and most allies in northern Europe have either never abandoned conscrip­tion or have reintroduced it since 2014. NATO’s capabilities in northern Europe have also grown considerably with the accession of Sweden and Finland. Countries in northern Europe are among the key supporters of Ukraine and share a common threat perception. In practical terms, this means closer defence cooperation among the Nordic-Baltic countries, 16 Poland and Germany. The Baltic states have developed close defence coopera­tion over recent decades, complemented by an allied mili­tary presence in the Baltic region since 2017 in the form of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence(eFP). Two-thirds of the NATO allies are already militarily present in the Baltic region. Two of the contributing states – the United King ­dom and France – are nuclear powers, while the United States(another nuclear power) has deployed troops sepa ­rately from the eFP format. Germany, in turn, is the biggest economy in Europe, and under its new government it pro­fesses to be finally ready to play a more significant role in deterring Russia and defending its frontline allies. Also, Poland understands that Russia’s aggression against the Baltic states would have far-reaching implications for its own national security. Thus, it is also ready to play a bigger role in the Baltic region by steadily increasing its own mili­tary capabilities and providing infrastructure for allied mili­tary mobility. The key challenge is to build a cooperative framework among the northern NATO allies that would offer enough in terms of military capabilities and political commitment to deter Russia, but there are other challenges that go be­yond simply having the frontline strength to defend against it. 17 Political cohesiveness and the ability to act 13 Torrey Raussig(2025): Four Fundamental Questions the NATO Summit Did not Answer. Washington, Atlantic Council, 27 June; available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/four-fundamental-questions-the-nato-summit-did-not-answer/ 14  Paul McLeary/Jack Detsch/Joe Gould(2025): Pentagon Halting Some Promised Munitions for Ukraine. Brussels, Politico, 1 July; available at: https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/01/pentagon-munitions-ukraine-halt-00436048 15  Veronika Melkozerova(2025): Russia Hits Ukraine with Biggest Attack of the War; F-16 Pilot Is Killed. Brussels, Politico, 29 June; available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-ukraine-biggest-attack-war-f16-pilot-kill/ 16  Eitvydas Bajarūnas(2025): Europe’s Vital Nordic-Baltic Shield. Washington, CEPA, 31 March; available at: https://cepa.org/article/europes-vital-nordic-baltic-shield/ 17  Veronika Slakaityte/Izabela Surwillo(2025): The Baltic Sea Region Reminds Us Deterrence Is More than Frontline Strength. Copenhagen, DIIS, 14 May; available at: https://www.diis.dk/en/research/the-baltic-sea-region-reminds-us-deterrence-is-more-than-frontline-strength NATO summit in The Hague: the Baltic perspective 4