Carney’s warning was stark. The post-World War II global order is no more. Instead the world is seeing“the beginning of a harsh reality where geopolitics[…] is submitted to no limits, no constraints.” Carney’s advice for the middle pow­ers(including Europe) was to band together:“When we ne­gotiate bilaterally with a hegemon, we negotiate from weakness. We accept what’s offered. We compete with each other to be the most accommodating.” Going it alone “is not sovereignty. It’s the performance of sovereignty while accepting subordination.” Given the“great power ri­valry, the countries in between have a choice – compete with each other for favor, or combine to create a third path with impact.” Carney’s conception of the future is not necessarily new or unique. The increasingly important role of middle powers has been talked about for some time. But the realization among Western leaders that they can no longer live the “pleasant fiction” of the liberal order that allowed them to reap the benefits of American hegemony, often at the cost of the Global South, is new. As is Carney’s explicit recogni­tion that middle powers of the Global North cannot chart this“third path” alone. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Finnish president Alexander Stubb clearly set the bar for European states:“The global South will decide whether geopolitics in the next era leans toward cooperation, fragmentation, or domination.” He as­serted that“this is the last chance for Western countries to convince the rest of the world that they are capable of dia­logue rather than monologue.” 5 For the Global South, this recognition evokes a sense of schadenfreude. For Europe, it must bring home the reality that it needs a far wider and more diverse set of partners if it is to have any chance of charting a successful alternative vision for the evolving world. Achieving this will not be easy. It will require Europe to change the way it sees global powers like China and Rus­sia, on the one hand, and how it treats the Global South, on the other. Europe must deal with the two global powers while forging, in Carney’s words,“different coalitions for different issues based on common values and interests.” Success in this endeavor may lead to, as Stubbs puts it,“a new symmetry of power among the global West, East, and South[that] would produce a rebalanced world order in which countries could deal with the most pressing global challenges through cooperation and dialogue among equals.” Europe as the alternative path The conversation about the transformation of the glob­al order is currently centered on three possible scenari­os: continued US leadership role and Sino-US rivalry leads to Cold War 2.0 with bounded systems; creation of new spheres of influence results in big power hegem­ony in each sphere; descent into fragmentation. But there is an alternative,“fourth” path that is rarely dis­cussed—one in which Europe and a coalition of capable middle powers beyond its borders provide a stabilizing framework, with both Washington and Beijing support­ing orderly multipolarity instead of pursuing hegemonic dominance. Such a path deserves serious examination, not because it is the most likely outcome, but because it may represent the most desirable alternative to the camp politics or chaos that otherwise lie ahead. What would distinguish such an arrangement from oth­er alternatives? Unlike a US-led order, it would not as­sume Western institutional dominance or the universal applicability of liberal norms. Unlike a China-led order, it would not rest on authoritarian capitalism or hierarchi­cal relationships centered on Beijing. And unlike frag­mentation, it could preserve meaningful multilateral co­operation and a more equitable, yet still rules-based, framework. The distinctive character of this scenario lies in its con­sociational nature—multiple centers of initiative coordi­nating around shared issue-based interests without de­manding ideological conformity or permanent align­ment. Europe brings institutional capacity, normative commitment(however battered), and economic weight. Middle powers of the Global South, best defined as “countries that are geographically, strategically, econom­ically, or geopolitically important and cannot be ignored by either the United States or China, but are seeking to pursue their interests—and geopolitical influence over­all—without getting trampled in the U.S.-China competi­tion,” 6 bring geographic diversity, demographic heft, and the legitimacy that comes from representing Global South perspectives. Together, they could potentially con­struct“workable arrangements” that address specific challenges without having to wait for great power con­sensus. In fact, in an ideal scenario, they would develop consensus positions on global issues that mitigate great power contestation and nudge the US and China to sup­port these middle power initiatives. 5  Alexander Stubb,“The West’s Last Chance. How to Build a New Global Order Before It’s Too Late,” Foreign Affairs, December 2, 2025. 6 “About the Project on Middle Powers: Vision,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, available at: https://www.belfercenter.org/pro­grams/middle-powers/middle-powers-about#:~:text=This%20project%20stems%20from%20a,tackle%20challenges%20in%20these%20domains? One can imagine countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Brazil, and others as being relevant here. Is a Stable Middle Power Order Possible? 3