seat at the big table, but they have little experience in managing a world in chaos. The conduct of many of these countries in their own regions—UAE and Saudi Arabia in East Africa or India in South Asia, for instance—has mirrored the very hegemonic tendencies they criticize the West for. Rather than forming broader alliance blocs, middle powers will have to learn to operate in fluid partnership groupings based on their convergence on particular global or regional issues. They may be cooperating with a friendly country on one particular issue but may also need to accept the presence of a foe in the same group. On other issues, allies may be in opposing camps. It will be crucial for Europe to navigate this middle power fluidity while remaining focused on the ultimate objective of pursuing cooperative multilateralism—in as broad a sense as possible in an otherwise highly contested world—to offer some semblance of global stability. So, what exactly is this“fourth” path? The world envisioned in this framework will not be a unified camp working as a global coalition of the willing under a unitary rules-based order acceptable to all. It will be a world where various middle powers, European and otherwise, come together for issue-based cooperation. In aggregate, it may resemble a single, synergetic power that seeks to create a world order that limits Hobbesian tendencies, allows these countries to use their collective weight to temper the intensity of great power rivalry, and pursues a positive global economic agenda with fairer resource distribution. A global order anchored in a Europe-middle power arrangement is not inevitable, nor even likely in the short term. But as the old order fragments and the alternatives of bipolar rivalry or chaos grow more menacing, it becomes increasingly worth pursuing. The conditions for its realization are demanding: European strategic coherence, middle power willingness to assume responsibilities, great power tolerance for autonomous initiative, and avoidance of the tech curtain. Yet, the difficulty of meeting these conditions should not obscure the fundamental point: the future is not predetermined. The forces of change will shape the next phase of global geopolitics. Whether that is conflictual or cooperative depends on choices made not only by the great powers but also by Europe and the middle powers of the Global South. In that sense, the Europe-middle power scenario is not merely an analytical construct but a call to action—an invitation to imagine and then build a global order primarily in service of human needs rather than great power ambitions. 8 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.
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Is a stable middle power order possible? : Europe's role in an alternative futures
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