Why might it work? Robbin Laird and Kenneth Maxwell have argued that the Sino-US competition is qualitatively differ­ent from“self-contained imperial systems[since] both powers are deeply embedded within global networks of production, finance, and trade.” They believe that“after thirty years of intensive globaliza­tion, the world’s major powers find themselves more enmeshed in global networks than in control of them.” 7 While President Trump’s policies resulted in a 36-percent drop in US imports from China in 2025, the areas of manufacturing and supply chain inte­gration are simply too numerous to imagine a di­vorce. These powers also face constraints that limit their ability to impose hegemonic orders on a large scale, even as Trump continues to talk about hemispheric dominance, his corollary of the Monroe Doctrine. The US faces domestic polarization, fiscal limita­tions, and a weary public. China faces economic slowdown, demographic challenges, and growing re­sistance to its assertiveness from neighboring coun­tries, despite its posturing in favor of multilateral co­operation for peace and economic prosperity as es­poused by President Xi’s“Community with a Shared Future for Mankind.” But most importantly, neither of them can simply withdraw from global govern­ance without incurring costs. Climate change, pan­demic prevention, financial stability, nuclear nonpro­liferation, and even the unknowns of the future tech­nological revolution require cooperation that transcends rivalry. In this context, both might find it beneficial to let Europe and middle powers maintain functional frameworks on issues where a US-China agreement proves impossible. This is not altruism but enlightened self-interest—permitting others to manage problems that would otherwise escalate and eventually demand the attention of great pow­ers under less favorable conditions. How might it work? For this scenario to function, Europe and non-Europe­an middle powers would need to assume distinct but complementary roles. Europe could leverage its expe­rience in constructing multilateral frameworks, but with some crucial differences from past practice. Insti­tutions would need to be more flexible, less bureau­cratic, and genuinely open to non-Western input. Mid­dle powers could contribute by ensuring that this in­stitutional approach also reflects their regional realities and is not just a European import. This im­plies that the traditional Western monopoly on defin­ing global priorities would need to end. Middle pow­ers would likely bring issues like debt restructuring, climate justice, and technology transfer to the fore­front, while Europe would need to ensure these agen­das remained connected to broader stability concerns. The arrangement would also require the distribution of financial and operational responsibilities across a wider range of state actors. Europe could continue to contribute, as it currently does, but there could be greater burden-­sharing as middle powers work toward increasing their capacities. The viability of this scenario, however, depends criti­cally on Europe remaining a unitary actor and middle powers moving beyond rhetorical opposition to the old order and assuming concrete responsibilities. This would require, foremost, three types of commitment: security, economic, and political. Top of this list is the security commitment. Regional conflicts would increasingly be handled by regional coalitions, with Europe providing support rather than leadership. Middle powers such as Indonesia, Brazil, or South Africa could take primary responsibility for cri­ses in their neighborhoods, with Europe providing backing in the form of diplomatic support, financing, and/or specialized capabilities. This is nothing new. During the 1956 Suez Crisis, for instance, Canadian diplomat Lester Pearson proposed the first United Na­tions Emergency Force(UNEF) to resolve the conflict between the then major powers(Britain, France, Rus­sia, and the US). 8 In 2022, Türkiye mediated between Russia and Ukraine to broker a deal ensuring safe grain exports. 9 Türkiye, the UAE, and Qatar have also facilitated prisoner swaps between Russia and Ukraine. 10 Canada and Norway led efforts to establish a global norm against landmines(Ottawa Treaty). 11 Pakistan played a pivotal role in bringing the US and China together in 1970. And this list is far from ex ­haustive. 7  Robbin Laird and Kenneth Maxwell,“Beyond Great Power Competition: The Rise of Middle Powers in a Globalized World,” SLDinfo, July 23, 2025. 8  United Nations Peacekeeping,“First United Nations Emergency Force(UNEF I): Background,” United Nations. 9 “Russia, Ukraine Seal Grain Deal in Istanbul,” Le Monde, July 22, 2022. 10 “Rural Prosperity Initiative Backs Women, Youth in Türkiye Farming,” Daily Sabah, February 23, 2026. 11 “The Treaty,” Canadian Landmine Foundation. 4 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.