Specific policies and strategic approaches Iceland has continued to build up military infrastructure at Keflavík Air Base(KAB), especially since 2017. In recent years, numer ­ous structures have been erected to house NATO soldiers. The buildup is funded mainly by NATO members, and partially by the Ice­landic government. 9 Currently, a 390 m berthing area and a 25,000 m2 oil depot are under construction as part of the enlarge­ment of NATO’s overall oil reserves. From 2017 to 2023 NATO allies’ overnight stays in Iceland increased by about 158%. 10 In January 2026, increased fears of a possible US invasion of Greenland arose in Iceland after President Trump’s statements on the topic, not least when he confused Iceland with Greenland. Public fears that Iceland might be used to launch an attack on Green­land emerged, while the government repeat­edly emphasized that nothing can be done about Greenland without Greenland, and that international law should be upheld. 11 The same month, President Trump’s appoin­tee as ambassador to Iceland, Billy Long, made the news. Apparently, Long had joked that Iceland would become the 52nd state of the U.S. and he would become its governor. This was not well received in Iceland, where a petition to bar Long from becoming the ambassador gained traction. An MP in the government coalition has pushed against his nomination and called his statement a threat to Iceland’s national security. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said she was‘not amused’ by Long’s joke and called on the US embassy for clarification. Iceland’s reliance on the United States for its security is a fact. Therefore, this recent devel­opment has been taken very seriously. The Icelandic government, especially Prime Min ­ister Kristrún Frostadóttir and Minister for Foreign Affairs Þorgerður Katrín Gunnarsdót­tir, have repeatedly emphasized that Iceland and the US maintain a strong bilateral rela­tionship. They have both emphasized in the Icelandic media that the bilateral defence agreement from 1951 still holds and that Ice ­land’s policy has not changed. Public atti­tudes, however, have changed significantly. Increasingly, Icelanders regard NATO mem­bership as the foundation of Iceland’s securi­ty, and notably, an increasing reliance on European allies is discernible as a European pillar within NATO. The shifts are particularly notable when data are compared from before and after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. 12 9 Hilmarsdóttir M.S.(2024). 300-400 hermenn og mikil uppbygging á varnarsvæðinu. RÚV. https://www.ruv.is/frettir/inn­lent/2024-12-09-300-400-hermenn-og-mikil-uppbygging-a-varnarsvaedinu-430604 10  Althingi(2023). Svar utanríkisráðherra við fyrirspurn frá Andrési Inga Jónssyni um viðveru herliðs. 1167/154 svar: viðvera herliðs| Þingtíðin­di| Alþingi 11  Reynisson J.T.(2026). Bandaríkin gætu notað ísland í innrás í Grænland. Heimildin. https://heimildin.is/grein/25917/bandarikin-gaetu-no­tad-island-i-innras-i-graenland/; Morgunblaðið(2026). Uppnám á Alþingi. https://www.mbl.is/frettir/innlent/2026/01/22/uppnam_a_althingi_i_ umraedu_um_graenland/ 12  Ómarsdóttir S.B.(2021). Leaning Into Cooperation: Changes in Icelanders’ Perspectives on International Politics after Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. Institute of International Affairs. Specific policies and strategic approaches 7