MARC SAXER| THAILAND CAUGHT IN THE VERTIGO OF CHANGE hierarchy will not resolve Thailand’s crisis. Further devel­opment will, in fact, depend on the resolution of the legitimacy crisis of the political, social, and cultural order. Thailand, like many hybrid systems, does have a refined democratic institutional landscape. Yet, political reality is still largely determined by traditional power structures behind these facades. While these traditional structures are increasingly undermined by socio-economic devel­opments, democratic mechanisms are not yet powerful enough to satisfy the growing expectations of society. Thailand is experiencing the de-legitimisation of its tra­ditional order, and is fighting fiercely over the renegotia­tion of the social contract. 4.1 Crisis of the Political and Economic Order: Complexity and Emancipation Overstrain the System Complexity Calls for More Effective Management Over the past decades, Thailand has undergone spec­tacular economic development. The enormous share of exports against the economic output(2009: 72 per cent of GDP) indicates in fact how deeply the country is integrated in the global division of labor. Economic mo­dernisation has multiplied the complexity of economic processes. Interdependencies, divergent interests bet­ween different sectors, and conflict over priorities and resources have become the standard. Permanent Conflict Needs Mediation Mechanisms Economic modernisation has fundamentally changed the professional lives of millions – not just in the metropolis Bangkok, but also in the tourist centres and industrial zones, the role models, ways of life, and identities have diversified. Thai society can no longer be adequately de­scribed in traditional labels such as»Amart«(aristocracy) and»Prai«(lower class). In fact, society has fragmented into a myriad of classes, occupational groups, sub-cul­tures, ethnic and religious communities. The diversifica­tion of conditions has promoted diverse and sometimes contradicting interests and values. The centralist gover­nance system is less and less able to efficiently manage the growing complexity of the economy. Pre-modern methods to deal with conflict(e. g., suppressing political dissent or negotiating compromises in non-transparent power circles) are increasingly being rejected by the peo­ple. In sum, the vertical and semi-authoritarian 10 gover­nance system lacks the proper mechanisms to mediate the permanent conflict typical for a pluralist society as well as lack the ability to effectively negotiate broadly accepted solutions between pluralities of actors. 11 Expectations about the Performance of the State Are Growing In a sense, it is increasing prosperity that challenges pre­modern rule by patronage. When resources were scarce, distribution had to be limited to small ruling coalitions, which excluded the vast majority of the population. In prospering economies, patronage can be challenged from two sides: by alternative patronage of new business elites, and via distribution of resources by the state. The rock-solid support for the»red« coalition by the poor can be explained by both: while Thaksin artfully styled himself as an alternative patron, the»help for self-help« policies of his government underscored that the Thai state seriously aimed to enhance the living conditions of the marginalised majority. This points to a deeper change in people’s expectations for the state: the state, so it goes, must become more responsive to the needs of its people and should actively produce life capabilities for all. Notwithstanding the growing prosperity of the elites and parts of the middle class, the development paradigm of the Thai state has fundamentally failed to deliver bet­ter conditions for the majority of the population. Hence, the pre-modern political economy undermines the out­put legitimacy of the political and economic order. Emancipated Citizens Have Higher Expectations for the Political Process These new expectations for the state’s performance are part of a broader change in expectations for the political process in general. This change first and foremost rede­fines the political role of the people, but it includes the entire political process. »Proud to be Prai« – the battle cry of the»red« shirts – may be a clever way to mobilise people who feel deprived of 10. Paul Chambers / Aurel Croissant / Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Democracy under Stress. Civil-Military Relations in South and Southeast Asia, Intro ­duction, Bangkok, 2010. 11. Mark Askew, Legitimacy Crisis in Thailand, Chiang Mai, 2010, p. 18. 9