MONUC and the Congolese authorities demanding that the UN immediately apply Chapter VII against Nkunda. From MONUC to MONUSCO: a first attempt at an exit strategy In June 2010, the Security Council reconfigured MONUC, believing that the DRC was entering a new phase in its transition towards peace. With the establishment of new national government following the 2006 elections, progress in the demobilization of armed groups, successful military operations against the FDLR, and the signing of the 23 March 2009 agreement that ending the CNDP rebellion, the Congolese government believed that the security situation in eastern DRC had improved. A withdrawal of MONUC was desired. A UN technical assessment entered discussions with the Congolese government and troop contributing countries, leading to an integrated strategic framework that would transform MONUC into a new mission. MONUSCO was born. Now that the transitional period was over, MONUSCO would assist the Congolese government in“stabilization” of the turbulent east. MONUSCO concentrated its military presence in three eastern provinces(North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema) and focused on the military operations in Kivu and Orientale Province and minimising the threat posed by armed groups. These stabilization actions were designed to give the Congolese state a change to gradually build its security forces and take over, strengthening the authority of the State. The Security Council gave MONUSCO a long lists of objectives. In addition to protecting civilians, the mission was tasked with supporting the DRC in reforming the security and justice sectors, developing and implementing a stabilisation and reconstruction plan, and combating the illegal exploitation of natural resources. Success would allow MONUSCO to hand over to the Congolese and withdrawal between June and August 2011. Fifteen years later, MONUSCO is bogged down in the east and the situation is increasingly desperate. War has resumed in the east, causing a humanitarian crisis unprecedented since 1999. The Congolese army’s inability to defend the country against local armed groups or foreign aggression highlights the failure of MONUSCO efforts to hand over security to the national forces. -­MONUSCO’s offensive mandate In April 2012, former CNDP commanders integrated into the Congolese army and stationed in North and South Kivu rebelled again. This new movement, accusing the Congolese government of failing to comply with the agreements of 23 March 2009, named themselves“M23” after the agreement. Months of clashes in Masisi and Rutshuru territories culminated in the brief occupation of the city of Goma on 20 November 2012. The Congolese army, in disarray, retreated to Minova in South Kivu. MONUSCO, despite its massive presence in Goma, did nothing to prevent the rebels from entering. This inaction was met with widespread criticism and the mandate become disputed by both international and civil society. Civil society organisations and international pressure for a more robust mandate soon Figure 1. Evolution of authorized MONUSCO personnel since 1999 Image 1 Persons displaced Authorized MONUC/MONUSCO Staffing Levels 1999-2025 different reports from the United Nations Secretary-General since 2000. years The illusion of protection. Peace support missions in the DRC 9