This means that, in general, MONUSCO bases are places of safety, unlike Congolese army positions, which cannot be considered as such by the population. the government. No official has come forward to explain. The failure of MONUSCO is shared between the organisation itself and the Congolese government. In a context of withdrawal, with MONUSCO starting to close bases, this reduction in deterrence can pose risks to civilian populations. In 2017, when MONUSCO decided to close its base in Pinga, North Kivu, the population expressed fears of a return to insecurity. These fears were validated when armed groups reoccupied the city following MONUSCO’s withdrawal. MONUSCO implemented additional protection mechanisms, beyond deterrence, in the areas where it was present. These included early warning mechanisms, patrols, and community capacity building. MONUSCO also supported the training of civil society organisations in different parts of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri. This has also helped to strengthen local protection capacities, although it also contributed to the polarisation of civil society. Despite successes, the cases in which MONUSCO failed in its preventive role were the most often cited to illustrate why the mission was a failure. Protection failures in Bukavu in 2004, Kiwanja and Kanyabayonga in 2008, Mavivi in 2014 and Kamananga in South Kivu in 2012, and Savo in Ituri in 2023 are regularly cited to explain how MONUSCO failed in its mission. A human rights activist from the city of Beni explained:[MONUSCO] is overarmed but ineffective due to a lack of will... I remember that in 2017, as in 2018, the rebels carried out multiple massacres less than 100 metres from the MONUSCO base in Mavivi and elsewhere. Under these circumstances, how can it remain? Who will trust it? Faced with this situation, we believe it must pack its bags. More than three interviewees explained that the emergence of the nebulous Raia Mutomboki army in South Kivu was a consequence of the massacre of civilians that took place in the presence of MONUSCO. An official from a human rights organisation in the city of Bukavu explained: Two weeks before the Kamananga massacre, MONUSCO was deployed. The FDLR massacred citizens. The people revolted and drove MONUSCO out. However, UN officials in South Kivu deny this. According to an official within the residual team of the United Nations Mission in Bukavu, there is a problem of understanding the mission’s mandate: MONUSCO supports the Congolese government. It is impossible to achieve 100% security. We are trying to mitigate the risks of violence. In this context, MONUSCO is assisting state structures in the transfer of capabilities so that the state can take over its role as soon as it leaves. But this explanation is inadequate, as summarised by a civil society official in Goma:(There is a) glaring lack of communication on the part of MONUSCO, but also a lack of courage and communication on the part of Challenges in protecting civilians: the illusion of protection? Although MONUSCO’s deterrent presence and its actions in other areas such as stabilisation and even«development» are recognised, it is struggling to forge an image of an effective protection force:[MONUSCO] built offices, supported the functioning of certain services, trained people in the protection of human rights, it has done a lot, but not really within the scope of its main mandate, which was to protect civilians. Unfortunately, today, civilians are not protected despite its presence. This report highlights three factors that influence the Congolese population’s expectations of the mission in the DRC: its logistics, its duration, and its vulnerability to political manipulation. 1. Tension between visible resources and results in the implementation of the mandate The population’s frustration with MONUSCO’s lack of action stems from the mission’s visible projection of strength. This strength is in comparison with the Congolese security forces, who are under-equipped and depend on MONUSCO’s logistical support. Through its visually impressive equipment and logistics, MONUSCO appears a powerful actor despite the force’s limited actual operational capabilities. One interviewee stated: We can understand the FARDC because they are very limited in many ways, but MONUSCO is a complete, structured entity. The FARDC lack everything; there are places they cannot access, and it is MONUSCO that sometimes facilitates their transport, but with no results. The population sees MONUSCO as a powerful army equipped to put an end to the killings and insecurity. Public discourse tends to compare MONUSCO to the FARDC without taking into account the different mandates of each organisation. Speaking about the ADF massacres in the Beni region, informants for this study pointed to their perceived capability of MONUSCO’s logistics and its inability to respond to attacks against civilians: With the intervention brigade made up of Malawians, South Africans and, most recently, Kenyans, we thought that this might be one of the solutions to the problem of armed groups and, above all, to the killings of the population by ADF rebels because we thought that with all their military arsenal and technology, it would be easy for them to find out where the ADF were and attack them, by bombing their camps. But we have seen that for more than ten years. 14 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.