bore fruit. In March of 2023, under pressure from SADC states and Congolese civil society, the Security Council declared that a new“Force Intervention Brigade”(FIB) would be integrated into MONUSCO. This new force was mandated to use force to neutralise armed groups. Central, MONUSCO withdrew from Tanganyika province in June 2022 and finally South Kivu in June 2024. It is now only present in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri. Withdrawal plans and regional alternatives The Security Council permitted the FIB to act alone or with the FARDC. The FIB took the latter option and fought alongside the Congolese army until the defeat of the M23 in 2013. This victory strengthened the MONUSCO’s public image. It also raised the expectations of the Congolese public, who saw that MONUSCO was capable of protecting civilians. Although the FIB was criticised by some experts the force as contradicting the peacekeeping principle of impartiality, most Congolese informants interviewed highlighted the FIB’s victory as a major success. The crisis of MONUSCO’s reputation Since the FIB’s success in 2013, MONUSCO’s popularity declined dramatically. Popular criticism of the mission during the CNDP war, which subsided in 2013 thanks to the mission’s victory over the M23, returned with a series of massacres in 2014 attributed to the Ugandan Islamist Allied Democratic Forces(ADF). The resurgence of the M23 in 2021, as well as populist rhetoric during the 2023 election heightened antiMONUSCO sentiment among the population. Again, MONUSCO was criticised for its inability to protect civilians despite a robust mandate. Relations between the Congolese government and MONUSCO become quite rocky. Attempts at joint operations between the Congolese and MONUSCO were blocked by human rights concerns. In 2015, after the Congolese government appointed Generals Fall Sikabwe and Bruno Mandevu to lead joint operations with MONUSCO against the FDLR, the UN demanded the officers be replaced due to allegations of human rights violations. The Congolese government accused the UN of meddling in internal affairs and decided to conduct operations alone. The mission’s inability to respond to the killings perpetrated by the ADF in the Beni region, despite the presence of a MONUSCO base and rapid response brigades, eroded the UN’s reputation. Since 2019, large anti-MONUSCO demonstrations in DRC have been held in Beni and Butembo, protesting UN inaction. The UN’s reputational crisis was worsened by a shrinking of resources. Since the end of the first M23 crisis in 2013, MONUSCO saw dramatic cuts to personnel by the Security Council. Its geographical presence correspondingly also declined. Initially present across the DRC, the mission gradually concentrated in the east. After closing its bases in the provinces of Tshopo, Kongo Central, Kasai and Kasai Following a series of protests against MONUSCO in 2020, the Congolese government and the UN agreed on a plan for a gradual and responsible withdrawal. As the M23 rebellion advanced into Rutshuru territory in 2023 and anticipating a new wave of protests against MONUSCO, the Congolese government demanded an accelerated withdrawal by December 2024. However, as the security situation underlying antiMONUSCO sentiment deteriorated, the mission mandate was extended by one year. The Security Council gave the mission two objectives: to contribute to the protection of civilians and to support the stabilization and strengthening of state institutions. On paper, MONUSCO’s new mandate remained robust. It authorised MONUSCO to take deterrent measures to protect civilians and gave it a mandate to conduct targeted and vigorous offensives in the DRC to neutralise armed groups and to conduct frequent and effective joint operations. It also authorised MONUSCO to support the demobilisation, disarmament and community reintegration process. However, the advance of the M23 and the capture of Goma and Bukavu reignited a two-pronged debate. First, it is debated if MONUSCO has the ability to implement an offensive mandate in the face of foreign aggression. Second, the advance calls into question the feasibility of a mission withdrawal under such dire circumstances. While MONUSCO withdrew from Bukavu in June 2024, new discussions are being held in New York on a possible redeployment to South Kivu. The continuing mobilisation of unruly local militia to counter M23 exposes the civilian population to serious threat of harm. Despite the mission’s robust mandate and the massive build-up of Congolese army forces, the security situation continues to deteriorate. Massacres of civilians by the ADF continue in the north of North Kivu and Ituri. In southern North Kivu province, the M23 continues to advance. Losing control, the Congolese government turned to regional forces for aid. In 2022, the East African Community mandated a force to intervene in the conflict. However, when deployed the EAC force interpreted their mandate differently than the Congolese, who desired a military ally, not a peacekeeper. The Congolese government, believing that the EAC-RF was not aggressive enough against the M23, decided to end the mission on the eve of the December 2023 elections. The EAC-RF was then replaced 10 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.
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