1 Introduction Introduction “We are all witnessing a major black swan event that is impacting most of our established practices, norms and regulations, and thus shaping to become the big disruptor.” Harsh Vardhan Shringla, India’s foreign secretary, opined in May 2020 1 . Like other countries, the disruption for India, just like for other countries, has been both internal and to its external strategic environment. Despite the challenge of containing a huge number of COVID-19 cases and an economic slowdown, it has been impossible to turn a blind eye to the churnings in the international order since the beginning of 2020. For India, there is genuine concern that China will step up to rede ne or dominate the new post-COVID global order. The mistrust of China that soared as the pandemic broke out seems irreversible now following the(still ongoing) border standoff between the two. The global outrage against China for its role in mismanaging the pandemic notwithstanding the resilience of its economy – and how it contained the pandemic within its borders - will ensure its continuing global prominence. The shortcomings of the West in managing the pandemic and its impact on the economies have, in contrast, been exposed, throwing up questions about its capacity to lead the post-COVID order 2 . Joe Biden’s victory in the US Presidential Elections may have stemmed concerns about a US retreat from global leadership, which was in motion under his predecessor Donald Trump, and China lling that vacuum. Whether the US retains the ability or even the willingness to restore the global balance remains to be seen. Amidst such global turmoil, there is also a counter­narrative centred on the opportunities before India. As Narendra Modi said in May 2021,“such a big disaster is a signal for India; it has brought a message and an opportunity.” He described“turning crisis into opportunity” as India’s vision 3 . Similarly, Shringla also stressed that the current crisis gives an opportunity to do away with what has not been working and adapt our systems to a changed external environment 4 . These opportunities are at three levels: to reorient India’s policy towards China and recalibrate its other external engagements; to project itself as a new manufacturing and investment hub to take advantage of the shift of production units away from China; and to play a leading role in de ning the new world and regional order. This paper seeks to examine some of the challenges thrown up during the COVID-19 pandemic, how New Delhi has sought to deal with them as an opportunity, and the prospects for success. The paper is divided into three parts: the rst explores the trajectory of India’s foreign and security policy; the second examines the prospects for India’s emergence as an alternative manufacturing hub and reducing its dependence on the existing global supply chains; and the third will delve into India’s notions on multilateralism and the existing global and regional institutions. India and the Geopolitics of COVID-19