India and Multilateralism 10 WHO as an opportunity to work outside of the existing multilateral order and position itself at the centre of an alternative global public health mechanism is equally concerning. 65 It has already resurrected the Health Silk Road(HSR) and provided medical aid to countries around the world showing its capacity to handle such a burden by itself. 66 The HSR serves a long-term objective of spreading its in uence among the recipient countries. At a time when resources are scarce and priority for highways and ports less, the HSR will help to reinforce China’s Belt and Road Initiative by shifting focus to critical public health infrastructure in countries in dire need of these criticaalssets. 67 Biden’s decision to rejoin WHO is a blessing for India. A more proactive American engagement with WHO and other international institutions, will help balance China’s in uence. However, this will be insuf cient for ensuring the long-term reforms that are badly needed. That would have to be a multilateral cooperative process with greater participation of developing countries. India is particularly insistent that developing countries should have a bigger say in setting WHO’s agenda. In December 2020, it put forward a nine-point reform agenda demanding new crisis-management protocols, affordable and adaptive healthcare systems, and greater transparency in WHO’s governance and use of funds. 68 India had assumed leadership of WHO’s Executive Body in May 2020 for one year. Its unwillingness to use this position to push for Taiwan’s reinstatement to WHO or criticise China for its role in the pandemic re ected India’s seriousness about using this opportunity constructively. At the same time, India remained committed to the idea that WHO reforms can wait as containing the health crisis is a more pressing priority. 69 India seems content just with lending its voice to the growing demand for the need for reforms and seeking out like-minded countries to initiate such debates – just as it has for reforms in other institutions- but a more proactive push for ensuring such changes itself may have to wait for a post-pandemicworld. India should also not lose sight of the need to re­energise its efforts towards promoting regional organisations. 70 In a post-COVID world, regional institutions, may assumegreater importance as the pandemic has accelerated the reversal of globalization, discredited global institutions and provoked a move towards more regional supply chains. Against such narratives, the idea of reviving or strengthening existing regional organisations is gaining ground. 71 Greater integration and connectivity through regional institutions has been a preoccupation of the Indian strategic community for decades. This serves both geopolitical and geo-economic objectives. Greater economic growth in the region through enhanced integration will fuel India’s domestic growth. This economic imperative has been strong in both India’s Neighbourhood First and Act East policies. India’s post­COVID economic recovery would also require a more prosperous neighbourhood and greater regional cooperation. 72 Such platforms also provide India an opportunity to project itself as a regional leader and use them to shape a more cooperative regional agenda, in stark contrast to the neo-imperialist design it believes China is promoting. This has become an even more urgent strategic consideration as India vies for regional predominance with China in its neighbourhood. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is not a viable platform for achieving these ambitions. Modi’s decision to hold a virtual summit with all the SAARC leaders in March 2020 and the subsequent establishment of a SAARC Emergency Relief Fund had generated some optimism about a possible revival. Modi was hailed in some quarters for seeking to reinvigorate an organization that he has largely ignored. 73 Following India’s border standoff with China, there were also suggestions about using SAARC to counter China’s growing presence in South Asia. 74 However, more than a year since the virtual meeting, there seems to be very little political will in India to pursue this, India used SAARC in the early days of the pandemic to project itself as a natural leader of the South Asian block and the subsequent medical assistance provided by it to other South Asian countries was also driven by similar strategic considerations. Such unilateral measures were meant to India and the Geopolitics of COVID-19