5 The future of India’s Foreign and Security Policy Malabar exercises was welcomed as a long-overdue measure towards greater militarization. Concerns in India about becoming part of a formal alliance seem unfounded as the Quad is far from being a formal organization or a military pact. It is best understood as a group of democracies geopolitically aligned over growing concerns about a common security challenge 3 . 2 It may also make it more appealing to countriesin Southeast Asia, many of whom remain wary of antagonising China and do not want to get caught in the middle of its rivalry with the Quad countries. India is also not keen on a greater institutionalisation of the Quad, preferring a more exible arrangement that can also involve other regional countries. 33 The Quad’s bene t for India and the region lies in its framing. De ned simply as an anti-China force, it may remain just a platform for signalling and posturing against China. However, a more positive agenda centred around collective action on core issues confronting the region – humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, cyber security, counter-terrorism and conspiracy, and connectivity- could shape the Indo ­Paci c to the vision of the four countries. 34 A start in this respect has already been made through active engagement on such issues since September 2019. At the Quad Summit in March 2021, for instance, there was a strong focus on the need for collaboration on COVID-19 vaccine production, emerging technologies, quality and sustainable infrastructure development, and climate change. 35 The recent momentum has ensured the emergence of the Quad as a regular forum for security and political dialogue. It is only likely to grow further from hereon, but its effectiveness would depend on the continued commitment of its member states, including India. India and the Geopolitics of COVID-19