11 India and Multilateralism counter China’s COVID-19 diplomacy by using a pre-existing frame without any desire to revive SAARC. Since then, it has received very little attention. Other member countries also do not see the pandemic as a necessary pretext to revive the organization, as evident from their refusal of Pakistan’s invitation in September 2020 to hold a summit. 75 India’s lack of enthusiasm towards SAARC is driven by Pakistan’s presence. India rmly believes that it hinders regional connectivity, and their bilateral ties have derailed SAARC’s working in the past. For instance, Pakistan blocked two of the three proposals for greater regional connectivity at the last SAARC summit held in 2014. The 2016 Islamabad summit was cancelled following India’s decision to boycott it because of a cross-border terrorist attack carried out by Pakistani militants against an Indian military base. It has subsequently refused the requests of other SAARC members as well to allow this process to resume. Cross-border terrorism, continues to remain a major obstacle for regional cooperation from India’s perspective. 76 Moreover, Pakistan’s propensity to raise the Kashmir issue at multilateral forums, and with greater frequency since India abrogated Kashmir’s constitutional autonomy in August 2019, may become an additional disincentive for India vis-à-vis SAARC. Even during the virtual summit in March 2020, Pakistan brought up the Kashmir issue, much to India’s resentment. The cease re announced by India and Pakistan at the Line of Control in February 2021 had fueled optimism about peace prospects in the region. Sustained India­Pakistan engagement may help revive SAARC as well. However, given the recent pattern of India­Pakistan relations, where any progress has been short-lived, a sudden—and highly plausible— breakdown in ties will once again derail SAARC. Over the past few years, India has shifted focus to the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation(BIMSTEC). Although this occurred during Modi’s rst term itself, the invitation to BIMSTEC leaders during the inauguration of his second term in May 2019 laid down a clear marker for this shift. For India, BIMSTEC is important as it excludes Pakistan and includes only like-minded neighbours truly committed to regional cooperation. 77 Undoubtedly, an organization free of the India-Pakistan baggage carries tremendous potential for the region.India has been urged to use the pandemic as an opportunity to take the lead in pushing the BIMSTEC countries to develop regional supply chains to reduce dependence on China. Bangladesh, with its economic resilience, has been identi ed as a critical partner for India to bring the BIMSTEC region together. 78 The Indian government itself has called for BIMSTEC countries to project themselves as alternative manufacturing hubs to China. 79 However, for this, India would need to be more proactive in investing in these economies, building capacities across the region, and being open to the idea of a free trade agreement. 80 India also needs to actively complete critical infrastructure projects and connectivity agreements that can integrate the region better. The India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway, the BIMSTEC Motor Vehicle Agreement, the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, and a coastal shipping agreement have all been in the pipeline for a while. However, due to bureaucratic hurdles, insuf cient political will, and lack of proper resources, they have failed to make suf cient progress. India has taken positive strides in enhancing its bilateral connectivity with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Myanmar. But in the absence of a broader multilateral framework tying them together as part of a larger regional network, BIMSTEC’s identity will remain weak. There has been limited engagement with BIMSTEC over the past year. The 17th BIMSTEC Ministerial Meeting was recently held in April 2021, the rst such engagement since 2018. However, the larger thrust of its regional engagement over the past year has been to manage and promote its relations with its neighboring countries but as bilateral or even trilateral efforts and not as part of a larger regional grouping. BIMSTEC is no stranger to a political lethargy that has stymied its momentum in the past. However, as India remains preoccupied with realigning its relations with the US, engaging ASEAN nations, and building on its ties with Australia and Japan, there remains the danger of BIMSTEC being neglected in favour of a broader Indo-Paci c strategy and other multilateral groupings.