Executive summary This one-year desk and field study has examined the Silk Road Economic Belt(the ‘Belt’) component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative from a security perspective. The report has three components:( a ) it has analysed what the Belt essentially is, what has driven China to initiate it, and how it relates to China’s own security interests;( b ) it assesses what the Belt’s security implications are and might be in two selected regions of the Eurasian continent(in this report‘Eurasia’ refers to the combined landmass of Europe and Asia), namely Central and South Asia; and( c ) based on the sum of these findings, this study elaborates on whether the Belt is a platform for European Union(EU)–China cooperation on mitigating security threats throughout Eurasia, and provides policy recommendations to the EU on how to proceed. In the context of the report,‘security’ is defined broadly in relation to intra- and interstate stability: it encompasses human security and developmental conditions. The Belt is a still-evolving, long-term Chinese vision for Eurasian infrastructural development, connectivity and economic cooperation. There exists a vast vacuum of critical infrastructure in large parts of Eurasia, which many relevant states are not able to fill, even with the aid of existing multilateral development funds. The Belt intends to fill much of this vacuum, and while the political longevity of the initiative and efficacy of its implementation remains to be seen, it has been received with enthusiasm throughout many parts of Eurasia. In official terms, the Belt is framed as a relatively altruistic offering, based on the principles of mutual benefit and win–win. It sets no a priori limitations on actors, methods or norms, and permits for a great deal of flexibility. In this regard, it has the potential to become a leading model of bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation in Eurasia. However, a number of stakeholders are sceptical of its feasibility, specifically in reference to security challenges throughout Eurasia. There are additional concerns about its geopolitical underpinnings, namely that the initiative is not in fact sufficiently multilateral, and serves to expand China’s strategic political and economic influence among participating states. There is little official Chinese discourse on its political drivers, which contributes to this speculation. But what is clear is that the Belt is driven by a wide range of motivations, including enhancing China’s domestic economic security by increasing its global economic and, particularly, financial clout, mitigating security threats, and garnering strategic space. Indeed, it has evolved beyond any singular issue to become a convergence and clustering of multiple diplomatic, domestic socioeconomic, financial, geoeconomic and geopolitical interests and drivers, as well as pre-existing governmental overtures and proposals. Whether it is able to successfully further China’s interests in relation to these issues remains to be seen. Regardless, China’s expanding overseas economic footprint through the Belt will, over the long term, serve as additional impetus for it to take leadership in global governance and regional and local state security affairs. Indeed, the Belt corresponds with China’s increasingly proactive security concepts, which stress common security through development and economic cooperation. The initiative may become one of the cornerstones of Asian economic growth and integration, and eventually of closer political and security cooperation among states, but the pathway to this scenario is long and fraught with obstacles. Without clearly defined targets it is difficult to assess the Belt in terms of success, or failure, over time. Indeed, China may have overestimated local institutional and economic governance capacity and its own financial and diplomatic clout. It may also have underestimated the breadth of the geopolitical difficulties it may encounter. Political tensions and