4 the silk road economic belt ‘BRI-related’ category. 14 This lack of specificity speaks again to the lack of a well­defined formal framework, but also to a high degree of flexibility for both projects and participating countries. As of mid-February 2016, China had signed official BRI­related memorandums of understanding(MOUs) with approximately 30 countries. By August 2016, this had reached active participation with over 60 countries and several international organizations, including the UN Development Programme (UNDP). 15 However, several of these MOUs have not yet been given much substance and BRI partner country follow-up and commitment has not always been notable. 16 Therefore, the Belt is very much a work in progress, one whose development may in fact be measured across decades. The initiative is referred to as a very long-term one by Chinese authorities, and no completion date has been set. 17 Thus, the Belt remains, at the conceptual level, a rather loose cooperation framework. While it aims to coordinate policies and economic development strategies among states, it does not set a priori parameters on methods, actors or mechanisms—nor is it treaty-based. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the Belt is not an entirely new endeavour. China and a number of states in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Eastern Europe have been promoting closer integration since at least the late 1990s. 18 To some degree, the Belt is also a continuation of China’s regional connectivity policies from the 1990s, and builds on a number of existing and uncompleted physical linkages throughout Eurasia. As such, the Belt serves to harmonize and synchronize existing fragmented policies with new policy aims, and current and future projects—including a number of existing oil and gas pipelines. 19 1.2. Exploring China’s motivations The BRI finds its origins in a number of policy ideas originating from Chinese ministries. Within China’s MFA, the Eurasian Division united a variety of regional economic cooperation initiatives that had been explored over the past decade into the Belt concept. Within the MFA’s Asia Division, the Belt idea was posited as a means of furthering Asian-Pacific integration and cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN). 20 Around the same time, the MOC proposed a plan for a large-scale outpouring of China’s capital reserves in order to stimulate economic demand overseas, to mitigate China’s structural overcapacity problems and to resolve the issue of slumping demand. 21 These various proposals came to the attention of the high-level political leadership and, after the 18th Communist Party of China(CPC) 14 Chinese Ministry of Commerce,‘2016 ᒤ 1 ᆓᓖሩĀаᑖа䐟ā⴨ ޣ ഭᇦᣅ䍴ਸ֌ᛵ ߥ ’[Investment cooperation with Belt and Road-related countries in the first quarter of 2016], Department of Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation, 21 Apr. 2016,<http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/date/201604/20160401302151.shtml>. 15 Chinese National Development and Reform Commission,‘“ аᑖа䐟 ” ᔪ䇮ਆᗇ㢟ྭᔰተ ’[Belt and Road construction has achieved a good start], 15 Feb. 2016,<http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwfb/201602/t20160215_774656. html>. 16 Montesano, F. S. and Okano-Heijmans, M.,‘Economic diplomacy in EU–China relations: why Europe needs its own“OBOR”’, Clingendael Policy Brief, June 2016, p. 5. 17 According to Renmin University Professor Wang Yiwei, the design of the initiative should be completed by 2021 (the centenary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, CPC) and the implementation phase by around 2049 (the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China). See Wang, Y., The Belt and Road Initiative: What Will China Offer the World in Its Rise (New World Press: Beijing, Feb. 2016), p. 16. 18 Shepard, W.,‘The new Silk Road is not Chinese, it’s international’, Forbes , 14 Oct. 2016. 19 More recently, other actors have also laid out integration visions for(Eur)Asia: notable examples include Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union(EEU), North Sea/Arctic route, and the North–South Transport Corridor(NSTC), India’s ‘Act East’ and its Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia connectivity vision, Japan’s Indo-Pacific concept, South Korea’s Eurasian Initiative and Turkey’s Vision 2023. 20 K., Zhao,‘ аᑖа䐟ÿⲴѝഭᯩ⮕⹄ウ ’[Research on the Grand Strategy of China’s BELT], Xinjiang shifan daxue xuebao(zhexue shehui kexue ban) , no. 1, 2016. 21 ‘ 䇨ழ䗮 : ѝഭ⡸傜ⅷቄ䇑 ࡂ 䴰 5000 ӯ㖾 ݳ ཆۘ᭟ᤱ ’[Xu Shanda: Chinese Marshall Plan to be supported by 500 billion in foreign exchange reserves],<http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/hgjj/20090806/07566578273.shtml>; and‘China’s Great Game: road to a new empire’, Financial Times , 12 Oct. 2015.