16 the silk road economic belt for this normative transformation. As Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University puts it, the intertwining of developmental trajectories will, over time,‘cover a much wider range of strategic elements beyond mere economic interests. A strong political dimension will be a must. Eventually this may even extend to providing security guarantees to select countries’. 96 Even among the Chinese, however, it remains difficult to assess how the realities and practical contingencies of the Belt’s implementation will affect China’s security policy and response, both in terms of on-the-ground protection and geopolitics more generally. 97 Non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states continues to be a central precept of China’s external security policy and there are no signs that this will change officially. While there is no suggestion that China has breached the bounds of host state consent or UN authorization and prioritization of non-military solutions, greater flexibility in China’s posture is already being observed and this shift will likely continue. 98 1.4. Conclusions The Belt is a long-term Chinese connectivity vision with no a priori parameters on methods, actors or mechanisms, nor much granularity to date. It therefore allows a great deal of flexibility and could—possibly—become a leading new model of cooperation and global governance. In this scenario, it may contribute to affecting the Bretton Woods system over time—to what extent this turns out be complementary or erosive is an open question. Given the Belt’s ambitions, a lack of official narrative on what China’s own drivers and interests are has resulted in concern among a number of China’s, mostly geopolitical, contenders. China’s public diplomacy in relation to the Belt has conveyed mostly notions of altruism and win–win cooperation, but the initiative is also calculated to serve many of China’s national interests. The Belt initiative has been proposed in response to China’s domestic economic problems and its foreign policy goals. The Belt also fits well into Chinas evolving security concepts, which stress common security through economic cooperation. Indeed, if the Belt is developed and sustained successfully, it could possibly become one of the cornerstones of further Asian economic growth and integration, and closer political and security cooperation in the region. It is beyond question that there is an immense infrastructure vacuum in large parts of Eurasia, which many relevant states have not been able to fill independently, nor with the aid of existing multilateral development mechanisms. There is also much untapped development and integration potential in Eurasia. The Belt could, therefore, be a win–win deal for some states. Yet, while the Belt intends to address the infrastructural and developmental needs of relevant states, the question is also to what extent China’s interests and drivers overlap with political and socioeconomic on-the-ground realities of such states. While the Belt has the potential to address some of the socioeconomic challenges in the Eurasian continent, there is also the prospect of a mismatch in governance expectations. Arguably, the Belt works best if other governments are comparatively as efficient at mobilizing themselves as China. Improved infrastructure can certainly serve as a catalyst for employment and economic activity, but tapping the developmental potential of infrastructure requires investment in human and institutional capital and 2015,<http://opinion.china.com.cn/opinion_83_131683.html>; Li(note 92). 96 Yan(note 24). 97 Multiple interviews with authors, Beijing, Apr. 2016. 98 He, M. and Zhang, J., ᯠэ㔨ѻ䐟㓿⍾ᑖⲴഭᇦᡈ⮕ ࠶᷀ [Analysis of the National Strategy of the New Silk Road Economic Belt], CPC News, 31 Dec. 2013,<http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/1231/c40531-23993161-4.html>.