12 the silk road economic belt Experts expressed to the authors that doubts have been raised both inside and outside China as to whether China is actually prepared to implement the Belt, although it should be noted that it is not unusual for there to be doubts about implementation for an initiative on this scale. 65 There are questions as to whether China has grown over­assertive and is pursuing‘rushed’ and excessively centralized‘blind development’. Questions also remain as to whether China has accurately and realistically researched and analysed the impact of political dynamics, as well as corruption and economic fluctuations on the Belt. Evidently, given the international partnerships on which this large-scale cooperation platform depends, the Belt is much broader in scope than could be accomplished by Chinese actors alone. The effectiveness of the governments of China’s Belt partners will be instrumental. Improved infrastructure can certainly serve as a catalyst for employment and economic activity, but tapping the developmental potential of infrastructure requires investment in human and institutional capital, and the implementation of smart economic policies by local states—it is certain to be a slow process and one that is not in China’s hands. 66 While such dynamics can, and indeed should, be highlighted, it would be premature at this stage to pass judgement on the current state of this process. The outcome of the various interactions will be observed as the Belt narrative unfolds. 1.3. Relation to China’s evolving security concepts Since the late 1970s and the era of reform and opening up, the main strategic thrust of China’s foreign policy has been to maintain a stable external environment in support of domestic socioeconomic development—the mainstay of legitimacy and regime stability for the CPC. Throughout the 1990s and the early–mid 2000s, this meant a posture that remained on the whole reactive, rather than proactively addressing international security threats. China largely focused on addressing peripheral and neighbourhood security issues, which affected its core territorial interests, as opposed to global power projection. 67 A number of drivers have led to an evolution in this security posture in scope and geography over the past decade, including an expansion in China’s overseas interests as well as a more robust willingness by leadership to take on the mantle of a global public goods provider. The Belt will accelerate both these tendencies, although it may be a proactive attempt to shape the political and indeed security environment in its favour. Security contingencies brought on by greater exposure of its economic assets and personnel will also probably lead to new shifts in China’s security practices. Although the Chinese Government does not explicitly refer to the BRI in strategic or security terms, the initiative does fall neatly into international security concepts that China has posited over the years. Included in these is China’s National Security Commission(NSC), first delineated in the 1998 Defense White Paper. Within its broader global trend of redefining‘security’ in the wake of the cold war, China’s criticized traditional zero-sum and one-sided perspectives. Instead, it stressed‘common security’ between states pursued through dialogue, cooperation and coordination. 68 65 Observers, Interviews with authors, Eurasia, Apr.-Oct. 2016. 66 Experts from China, Central Asia and South Asia, Interviews with authors, Apr., June and Sep. 2016. 67 These are: state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, China’s political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development. Chinese State Council Information Office,‘China’s Peaceful Development’, Sep. 2011,<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/whitepaper_665742/t856325.shtml>. 68 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,‘China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept’, July 2002,<http:// w w w.f mprc.g ov.cn/m f a_ eng /w j b_ 663304/zzjg_ 663340/g js_ 665170/g jzz yhy_ 665174/261 2_ 66521 2/2614_ 665216/ t15319.shtml>.