A comparative framework This paper proposes a framework for comparing and assessing the far-right threat, which takes into account different combi­nations of potential changes across three dimensions:(i) vot­ers,(ii) parties and(iii) institutions(see Figure 1). Each of these dimensions represents a specific arena of political contestation that can determine far-right party success: demand, namely the grievances that make far-right parties appealing; supply, that is, factors related to parties and party systems; and insti­tutions, in other words, the configurations of state authority and societal organisation that shape democratic outcomes. By mapping the ways in which distinct combinations of changes across these dimensions may lead to different potential out­comes, we identify different scenarios of far-right democratic backsliding across different countries. This may enable policy­makers to develop a range of counterstrategies tailored specif­ically to each case, depending on the configuration of the far­right threat across the different dimensions. Conceptual framing Voters Figure 1 right parties are those that broadly mobilise peripherals. To measure the»voter« dimension we need to examine indexes that capture the breadth of the far-right voter base and offer information about the size of the peripheral groups. (ii) Parties This dimension captures the resilience of the party system. ­Far-right party success also depends partly on the parties themselves and the ways in which they operate in their domes­tic political arenas. To understand it therefore we need to con­sider both internal(party normalisation) and external(party system permissiveness) supply-side dynamics. In terms of in­ternal supply, we know from the literature that far-right parties themselves may largely determine their own electoral fortunes (Mudde 2004) by presenting themselves in a palatable way as legitimate political actors. The literature has shown that far­right party normalisation(Valentim 2024) and»civic« national ­ist normalisation(Halikiopoulou et al. 2013; Turnbull-Dugarte et al. 2025) have facilitated this process across a broad number of countries in Europe and beyond. In terms of external supply, far-right party success depends on available political opportu­nity structures, the permissiveness of the system within which these parties operate(Golder 2016), as well as party system institutionalisation, as institutionalised systems may both ­enable far-right breakthroughs and condition their durability. ­To measure the»party« dimension we need to examine in­dexes that capture far-right party normalisation, party sys­tem permissiveness and party system institutionalisation. Far-right threat to democracy Institutions Parties (i) Voters This dimension captures the resilience of the voter base. ­Far-right party success depends partly on the breadth of these parties’ electorates. We know from voting behaviour literature that major party electoral potential is associated with a mobi­lisational capacity beyond core voting groups(Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2023). To visualise the breadth of the far­right electorate, one might imagine two broad types of voters: those driven by ideology(core voters), who support the far right on principle; and those driven by protest(peripheral vot­ers) who tend to support the far right as a way of expressing their discontent and punishing the establishment(Halikio­poulou and Vlandas 2022). Given that peripheral voters are the largest group of far-right voters, the most successful far­(iii) Institutions This dimension captures the resilience of democratic insti­tutions. Far-right party success ultimately depends on the ability of these parties to take over institutions. For exam­ple, entrenched far-right parties specifically target demo­cratic checks and balances, such as the legislature and ­judicial safeguards, as well as civil society organisations and the media. To measure the»institutions« dimension we need to use indexes that consider the robustness of a broad range of democratic institutions at both the starting and end points within a designated time-frame, such as the V-DEM(Coppedge et al. 2023) indexes. Scenarios of democratic backsliding Distinct combinations of changes across these three di­mensions may result in a variety of different scenarios of far-right democratic backsliding. Figure 2 presents a five-­scenario hypothetical nested-triangle visualisation with ­variable angles. Each scenario distorts toward the vertices (voters, parties, institutions). This lets us see which force is most dominant in each threat scenario, and where the main source of vulnerability lies. Each corner represents an»index« of resilience: voter-base resilience, party system resilience and institutional resilience. Higher scores on each dimension Arenas of far-right threat and democratic resilience 2